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Abstract
Computer security continues to increase in importance both in the commercial
world and within the Air Force. Dedicated hardware for security purposes presents
and enhances a number of security capabilities. Hardware enhances both the security
of the security system and the quality and trustworthiness of the information being
gathered by the security monitors. Hardware reduces avenues of attack on the security
system and ensures the trustworthiness of information only through proper design and
placement. Without careful system design, security hardware leaves itself vulnerable
to many attacks that it is capable of defending against. Our SHI(EL)DS architecture
combines these insights into a comprehensive, modular hardware security backplane
architecture. This architecture provides many of the capabilities required by the
Cybercraft deployment platform. Most importantly, it makes significant progress
towards establishing a root of trust for this platform. Progressing the development of
the Cybercraft initiative advances the capabilities of the Air Force’s ability to operate
in and defend cyberspace.
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SHI(EL)DS:
A Novel Hardware-based Security Backplane
to Enhance Security with
Minimal Impact to System Operation
I. Introduction
D
edicated hardware provides significant improvement to security solutions when
properly designed and implemented. This work explores how and what ad-
vantages are gained by a security system through its use. It develop a general se-
curity architecture called Secure Hardware Intrusion (Elimination, Limitation, and)
Detection System (SHI(EL)DS), which incorporates hardware to improve a system’s
overall security and provide a basis for the Cybercraft deployment platform. This
work supports the Air Force’s expanded mission of defending Cyberspace. By pro-
viding improved security of our computer systems and supporting the development
of Cybercraft, this research helps to protect vital information and assets as more and
more of our military becomes reliant on computer systems. This research provides
direct application to server networks and critically exposed systems in our networks.
1.1 Background and Problem Overview
Despite computer security continuously increasing importance in today’s con-
nected world, the capabilities and speed aspects of computer performance continue
to dominate designer’s primary goals when creating new systems. With security not
1
receiving the main focus of designers, the responsibility is pushed from hardware to
software developers to implement good programming practices and adapt how an
operating system (OS) handles the processes it is given to control. These practices
are often ignored, compounding the inherent vulnerabilities of a computer system,
and even when considered become increasingly difficult to achieve as systems become
more and more complex. A number of hardware-based solutions have been conceived
in recent years, though again most are not designed by the primary designers, but left
to third party developers and built as peripherals to the system. Although developers
such as IntelR©have begun to design Trusted Execution Technology into their archi-
tectures, they still have limited scope and usability [31]. Despite this work and the
ever increasing number of security focused publications, the number of vulnerabilities
reported each year has increased 35-fold from 1995 to 2005 and continues to increase
through the present [12].
Compounding the issue of creating a viable security solution is the inherent
inverse relationship, especially in software based solutions, between how secure a sys-
tem is and its usability/performance. Few designers and developers are willing to
trade performance for security, creating a demand for any security system to provide
a significant increase in security for any small amount of performance degradation.
Developing a hardware-based security backplane eliminates contention for system re-
sources and leaves a much smaller degradation footprint on a production system,
especially in the realm of monitoring.
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The current field of computer security creates defenses which are significantly
flawed. Lack of realtime monitoring capability and known accurate information
severely hamper current security solutions. Once the system software core, the kernel,
has been compromised current software security solutions are also compromised since
they run as a process managed by the kernel. This problem extends to all software
solutions, regardless of their own security measures.
1.2 Research Goals
This research aims to accomplish a number of goals. It attempts to understand
the role of hardware for enhancing security within a system. This research explores
if it is necessarily or helpful, and how to implement it to achieve improved security.
It also evaluates a number of proposed hardware security solutions based on this
understanding. This research aims to clearly identify how to ensure security monitor
receives accurate data. Without accurate data, any attempts to interpret this data
and act on what it is telling the security system runs a much higher risk of providing
erroneous operation of the security system.This research explores the security of the
information being passed from the production system to the security system and how
to categorize it.
Having explored the need for hardware in security, this research leverages an
understanding of the role of hardware in security and how to ensure a monitor receives
accurate data to develop a dedicated security hardware backplane. The design of this
security backplane aims to provide a system with three key advantages. It provides an
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unobtrusive design with little or no change to existing production system operation
and performance. It also provides maintainable self security even when the security
of the production system is compromised. Finally, it leverages hardware primitives
identified to provide and enhance unique aspects of monitoring and response. After
developing the hardware security backplane architecture, this research presents this
architecture as a basis for developing the Cybercraft deployment platform. It attempts
to design the security backplane to meet the goals of the Cybercraft initiative.
1.3 Contributions
Through the course of this research, a number of contributions to the field of
computer security are presented. They are listed here:
• This research identifies a new axis of security for the information being passed to
the security system/monitor from the production system and developed a cate-
gorization for the Trustworthiness of Information being retrieved by the security
system, identifying whether the possibility for compromise of this information
is possible.
• This research develops a critical understanding of the need for dedicated hard-
ware to enhance security. It analyzes why software is incapable of securely
protecting software when operating on the same system and shows that hard-
ware in and of itself does not necessarily improve on software-based solutions
without proper design and location. It also presents advantages gained and en-
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hanced through the use of dedicated hardware and explicitly defines hardware
requirements to solve inadequacies of software solutions.
• This work develops a novel hardware security backplane architecture that pro-
vides a framework for development of security solutions. It utilizes an un-
derstanding of the Trustworthiness of Information and the requirements for
providing improvements through dedicated hardware in security.
• Lastly, this research augments the Cybercraft initiative development by enabling
a root of trust for the Cybercraft deployment platform with the backplane ar-
chitecture. It also provides additional information and capabilities to be utilized
by Cybercraft sensor, decision engine, and effector payloads.
1.4 Document Layout
Chapter II provides an overview of different classifications and taxonomies re-
lating to intrusions, intrusion detection, security, and trust. This work provides a
basis for a discussion on dedicated hardware for security in Chapter III. It presents
research into why dedicated hardware is needed, the advantages which can be gained
from it and what precisely is required to realize these advantages. This research also
explains what is meant by hardware-based security. To aid in the discussion of the
necessity of hardware we develop a classification for the trustworthiness of informa-
tion, showing that only hardware is capable of providing First-hand Information, a
necessary condition for guaranteeing accurate monitoring.
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With this understanding of hardware this research presents an overview of cur-
rent security solutions in Chapter IV. It looks at a number of software and virtual
machine monitor (VMM) solutions and discuss their weaknesses in terms of the un-
derstanding gained from the previous chapter. This work explores a wide range of
research presenting hardware solutions in both host and network intrusion detection.
It evaluates these hardware solutions in terms of how effective they are in achieving
the advantages of hardware laid out in Chapter III and how closely they adhere to
the requirements presented there.
After exploring different proposed and implemented security solutions, this re-
search develops a security backplane to provide a comprehensive security solution.
Chapter V lays out the SHI(EL)DS architecture. This architecture attempts to
achieve unique and enhance current security capabilities, through meeting the require-
ments outlined in Chapter III. By forming a security backplane concept designed to
be modular and minimize modification to the production system, this work presents
an architecture that achieves enhanced security without modifying the instruction set
architecture (ISA) of the production system. Chapter VI presents the SHI(EL)DS ar-
chitecture as the basis for creating the Cybercraft deployment platform. Chapter VII
concludes this work with a summary of the key contributions and a discussion of
future research avenues that are opened by this research.
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II. Review of Computer Security Taxonomies and
Classifications
H
ere we present research related to our own work. To frame the discussion of
our research we will present work into a number of different topics. First we
will look at classifying different types of attacks and methods of intrusion detection
(ID). We will present different intrusion detection systems (IDS) which have been
implemented along with a number of hardware-based security mechanisms which have
been proposed.
2.1 Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Exploits
There are various types of attack. Viruses, Rootkits, Timing-based Attacks,
and Relocation Attacks are described here to aid in the discussion of this work. A
limited number of specific exploits are described, which are important motivation to
this research and examples of important limitations of current software or hardware
solutions.
2.1.1 Classifications of Attack. Numerous works have presented work on
creating taxonomies of security flaws [37] and types of attacks [41, 40, 51]. Most
classifications of intrusion are developed from the attackers point of view [1, 44]. A
few basic descriptions of different types of attacks are presented here to help frame
the discussion of Intrusion Detection as compiled by Hart [26] and Mott [48].
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Virus A virus is malicious code that is attached to other software. It does not self-
propagate.
Worm A worm is malicious code that is self-propagating.
Trojan A trojan is malicious code embedded in innocent software to provide new
avenues of attack into a system. Can be either non-self-propagating or self-
propagating.
Rootkit A rootkit is code that relies on root level access to modify system call
interaction.1 Malicious rootkits are used to hide inappropriate actions from the
OS and anti-virus software. There have been a number of research efforts into
attempting to classify different types of rootkits [39, 50].
Timing Attack This form of attack exploits sequences of system calls to find vulner-
able states and use knowledge of the interval an IDS scans at to avoid detection.
Relocation Attack This attack consists of malicious code which relocates itself to
avoid detection. Code can be relocated to memory which is not monitored or
even potentially to remain purely in cache [55].
Rutkowska presents a taxonomy for defining stealth malware [62]. Although
she considers malware to only include code that modifies the behavior of the OS
or applications sensitive to security, her taxonomy includes a Type 0 Malware that
encompasses this type of malicious code. Her taxonomy is:
1Rootkits can be used for both beneficial and detrimental purposes, this research is primarily
concerned with Malicious rootkits
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Type 0 Malware This type of malware includes malicious code such as a botnet.
She does not include this in her definition of malware because, although mali-
cious, it does not compromise the OS or running processes.
Type I Malware This malware is defined as code that hooks into the OS or pro-
cess by modifying relatively static resources, such as executable file and code
sections in memory. She proposes that this type of malware can be detected by
verification software. To accomplish this, there must be some baseline, such as
digitally signed executables. The current roadblock to detecting Type I Malware
consistantly is the practice of legitimate software, such as antivirus programs,
using this hooking technique also.
Type II Malware This malware hooks into dynamic resources, such as the data
sections of processes. Since these resources are supposed to be modified, a
static verification tool cannot reliably detect this type of malware.
Type III Malware This malware does not hook into either the static or dynamic
regions of the OS or processes. She presents her Blue Pill proof-of-concept, which
uses AMD’sR©hardware virtualization technology. Since this type of malware
does not modify any part of the OS or its processes, even a dynamic verification
tool would not be able to detect the malware’s presence. Blue Pill is discussed
in more depth in Section 4.2.5.
2.1.2 Taxonomy of Vulnerabilities. Bazaz and Arthur present research to-
wards creating a taxonomy of computer vulnerabilities [6]. Figure 2.1 illustrates their
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proposed taxonomy. Although this taxonomy presents a good start for classifying vul-
nerabilities, the three main classifications of main memory, input/output (I/O), and
cryptographic resources are incomplete. This taxonomy could be made more com-
plete by expanding main memory and I/O to include other volatile memory locations
within a system such as the memory controller’s address tables and any modifiable
firmware like the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS).
Figure 2.1: Bazaz and Arthur’s Taxonomy of Vulnerablities
2.1.3 Important Specific Exploits. This section presents specific exploits to
vulnerabilities that motivate aspects of this research to go beyond the standard areas
of security discussion.
2.1.3.1 Defeating Hardware Based RAM Acquisition. Rutkowska dis-
cusses both software and hardware approaches to memory acquisition with the claim
that the hardware-based approaches are superior to that of software-based solu-
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tions [63]. After citing non-persistent malware as motivation for needing memory
acquisition, she presents a number of known exploits of software memory acquisition
by code running at the same privilege level as the acquisition software and notes
that they require additional software on the target machine which she claims violates
the forensic tool requirement not to write data to the machine which is targeted.
Rutkowska extols the virtues of hardware-based solutions, setting her readers up for
her defeat of this “superior” memory acquisition method.
Figure 2.2: Rutkowska’s Defeat of Hardware Based RAM Acquisition
Rutkowska delivers three levels of compromise to hardware based memory acqui-
sition devices such as CoPilot and Tribble each building upon the same basic exploit
with increasing levels of damage. As shown in Figure 2.2, this exploit involves config-
uring the memory controller on the north bridge to map arbitrary ranges of physical
memory to I/O space. This remapping denies memory access to peripheral devices,
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in I/O space, for the specified physical memory range while not effecting the memory
access of the processor(s). The three levels of exploitation she presents are:
Denial of Service Attack Her attack can deny the monitor access to the specified
memory range.
Covering Attack It can provide the monitor with repetitive masking data.
Full Replacing Attack This attack can even provide the monitor with specifically
formatted data to deceive the monitor into believing it is monitoring a system
which has not been compromised.
The exploits which Rutkowska presents definitively show that current hardware
based memory acquisition devices, specifically those which plug in as a PCI device,
are not reliable. The lesson to be taken from her work is not that hardware cannot
do a better job of providing security features, rather that hardware is not a magic
bullet; it does not automatically improve security. This work highlights that many
current hardware solution are missing an important aspect of the capability and se-
curity of the monitoring system. This provides a substantial motivator to explore the
trustworthiness of the information being received by a security monitor. This critical
axis of security for a monitor, though acknowledged in numerous works [36,79,55,11]
is not well understood and certainly not clearly defined. Section 3.2.3 provides defini-
tive categorization along this axis to help all future work in security related fields
understand what is required to provide truly reliable security monitoring.
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2.2 Taxonomies and Classifications of Intrusion Detection
Significant work has gone into classifying the different aspects of intrusion de-
tection. This section discusses many of these taxonomies to provide a framework
for classifying our security backplane as well explore missing classifiers from current
work. It discusses classifications for how a system attempts detection, the goals of
detection, the timeliness of response of detection, and the response itself. This section
finishes the discussion of classifications and taxonomies by discussing how to classify
the security of the IDS itself. A second axis of the IDS’s security not well explored
and previously undefined is noted, relating to the trustworthiness of the information
the IDS is receiving.
2.2.1 Intrusion Detection Methods. Axelsson [5] describes a taxonomy of
intrusion detection, which is extended by Williams [79] to include specification-based
attacks first described by Ko [35]. This taxonomy is:
Anomaly-based Detection This type of detection monitors a system or process
for abnormalities. It assumes anomalous activity is most likely non-self. There
are two types of anomaly-based detection: self-learning and programmed, which
are differentiated on how they establish a baseline of self to compare against for
abnormal behavior. These generally have better ability to detect novel attacks.
Signature-based Detection This detection checks potential intrusions against a
database of signatures. Signatures can be based on both the actual intrusive
code or the traces left in a system from them. They operate without knowledge
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of what constitutes normal behavior in a system. These signatures must be very
specific and have much better coverage rates from known intrusions.
Specification-based Detection This type of detection provides capabilities to sys-
tems which have clearly defined security specifications. These systems can build
models to detect deviations from these specifications. These specifications take
two forms: default-deny, which specifies legitimate actions; and default-permit,
which specifies illegitimate actions. Williams points out that although Axelsson
categorizes much of this as anomaly-based detection, it shares elements of both
anomaly-based detection and signature-based detection, and does not fit neatly
into either category [79].
Each of these types of detection provide valuable abilities to a system. The
inclusion of a dedicated security processor provides for increased ability to analyze
the system’s state for anomalous behavior and provides a protected location to store
signatures. The increased precision of detection and response provided by our system
allows for significant improvement in the use of specification-based detection, since
the specification can be defined more precisely. Specifications can be securely updated
and are protected from malicious tampering. This is important since any compromise
to the detection methodology can invalidate its ability to function correctly. One
example of this would be a specification on allowable jump targets for a specific
section of a process’ code. If malicious code can modify what targets are allowable,
it can mask its intrusion by adding the malicious jump target to the allowable list.
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2.2.2 Goals of Detection. Kuperman [36] puts forth different goals of com-
puter security monitoring (CSM) in his dissertation. These goals are:
Detection of Attacks This involves detection of attempts to exploit a specific vul-
nerability.
Detection of Intrusion This involves detection of non-legitimate users attempts to
exploit the system.
Detection of Misuse This involves detection of inappropriate use by authorized
user
Computer Forensics This involves data gathering of previous activities to attempt
to capture what caused departure from a safe state
Our security backplane enhances the ability of a security system to achieve each
of these goals though the largest thrust of our research focuses on the detection of
attacks. The addition of hardware monitors throughout the system provide access
to information which is not normally gathered and can be leveraged against specific
vulnerabilities. Though it is not the focus of our research, the security backplane at
the networked level can provide vital resources for computer forensics.
2.2.3 Timeliness of Detection. Kuperman also uses the timeliness of detec-
tion to help classify the operation of different CSM systems. His notation recategorizes
time into an ordered sequence of events. With this understanding he defines the set
of all events that can occur in the system as E, the subset of all malicious events as
B ⊆ E and three events a, b, c ∈ E and b ∈ B Given the notation tx to represent the
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time of event x occurring and x → y representing a causal dependence of y upon x,
we assume that they three events are related such that a→ b→ c and therefore
ta < tb < tc (2.1)
must be true. Note that although x → y represents a causal dependence it does not
necessarily mean that x is the direct cause of y.
The last piece of notation Kuperman defines for these purposes is the detection
function D(x) which determines the truth of the statement x ∈ B. This detection
function is both complex and widely varied through different security systems and are
almost exclusively imperfect. Kuperman defines the two problem cases for detection
within the bounds of his notation
False Positive: x /∈ B,D(x) = true (2.2)
and
False Negative: x ∈ B,D(x) = false (2.3)
With the notation defined Kuperman presents four main timeliness categorizations
for CSM. These are:
Real-time Detection The detection of a bad event, b, occurs while the system is
operating and before any event which is dependent upon b occurs. Therefore
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the following order is required
tb < tD(b) < tc (2.4)
or alternatively,
tD(b) ∈ (tb, tc) (2.5)
Near Real-time Detection The detection of a bad event, b, occurs within some
predefined time step δ, either before or after tb.
|tb − tD(b)| ≤ δ (2.6)
or,
tD(b) ∈ [tb − δ, tb + δ] (2.7)
Periodic Detection Also referred to as Batch Analysis, batches of events are ana-
lyzed by the security system at a periodic interval, p, which is normally on the
order of minutes or hours. Therefore events must be ordered
tD(b) ≤ tb + 2× p (2.8)
giving the security system, in the worst case p time to analyze the batch. If
tD(b) violates this constraint, the security system will not be able to finish its
analysis of a batch before the next batch analysis needs to start.
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Although near real-time and periodic detection have effectively the same mea-
sure (with δ being equivalent to 2×p) the key difference between the two is that
near real-time is event driven, where periodic driven by the security system and
polled at the rate p.
Retrospective Detection The detection of a bad event does not occur within any
set time-bounds and typically use archived event data. Many systems which
operate within the first three time categories also have the ability to operate in
this manner as well.
Kuperman comments that this timeliness categorization should be independent
of the underlying hardware and the rate of event occurrence. Although this goal is
desirable for a software-based solution, it relies on assumptions of trustworthiness and
lack of vulnerabilities in this underlying hardware. With today’s computer hardware
this independence is unobtainable. One specific example of why hardware cannot be
blindly trusted is Rutkowska’s attack discussed in Section 2.1.3.1. Our research aims
to achieve Real-time Detection and significantly reduce the δ value for Near Real-time
Detection when Real-time Detection is not achievable.
2.2.4 Intrusion Detection System Responses. Stakhanova et al. present
research towards defining a taxonomy of intrusion response systems [68]. Figure 2.3
presents their taxonomy discussed briefly here. From this taxonomy they highlight
key categories which are desirable for an “ideal intrusion response system”
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Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of Intrusion Response Systems copied directly from [68]
Automatic Due to the volume of intrusions and the speed with which a system can
incur serious damage from being compromised, solely human based responses
have an unacceptably high window of vulnerability. The more the response can
be shifted towards automated, the better the system is able to respond.
Proactive A system’s response needs to occur quickly to minimize the impact of
compromise. Ideally a system would respond in real-time (2.4) allowing the
system to completely negate the impact of the attack.
Adaptable The more a system is able to adapt to the the changes within a sys-
tem and changes to the methods of attack, the more the system will be able
19
to remain autonomous from administrator interaction and continue responding
automatically effectively.
Cost-sensitive This category of system is designed to take into account the idea that
the intrusion system’s response might be more costly than the actual symptoms
would be. A system which takes into account this tradeoff can provide a more
tailored response to potential attacks.
Our hardware-based security backplane, described in Chapter V, incorporates
many of these concepts. Our design is shaped to fall within most of Stakhanova’s
desirable categories.
2.2.5 Classification of Monitor’s Security. An often overlooked aspect of
a computer security monitor is the security of the monitor itself. This security is a
critical aspect of a security system, since compromising the monitors can effective
render the security system useless. Mott presents a classification of the security of
the monitors creating eight levels of monitoring system security [48].
Open This worst case scenario occurs when the monitored system has knowledge of
the monitor and coordinating and sharing information with the monitor without
any security mechanisms present to protect the monitor from compromise.
Soft Security This level of monitor security is equivalent to open with additional
software techniques used to secure the monitor. Both of these levels tend to
contain monitors on a uniprocessor host-based intrusion detection system.
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Passive Security The monitor operates without the monitored system necessarily
knowing it is there. To compromise such as system, information about how
the monitor analyzes gathered state data must be known. Prime examples
of this level of security are most network IDSs where only network traffic is
monitored. Specific information passed over the network has the potential to
disable the system, but their are no direct avenues of attack. IDSs of this nature
are discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Self Security Similar to both open and soft security systems, the monitored system
shares information with the monitor. The manner in which the monitor operates
provides it with security, requiring the monitored system to be compromised
before the monitor can be compromised. This security can be enhanced through
software-based techniques. An example of this level of security is Williams’
CuPIDS [79] which is discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.
Loose-hard Security The monitored system again has knowledge and coordinates
with the monitor, sharing information, but dedicated hardware mechanisms pro-
tect key portions of the CSM from compromise. One example of this level of se-
curity are hardware-based return address stacks [38] discussed in Section 4.3.4.2.
Semi-hard Security The monitored system’s knowledge of the monitor is extremely
limited. To provide this level of security the monitor cannot execute on the
same processor core as the monitored software and communications happens
through mechanisms like unmaskable interrupts which are kept to a minimum.
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Compromise can only occur via code controlling synchronization signals to the
monitor, which would cause the monitor to operate in a diminished capacity.
Strict-hard Security This security level adds to the requirements of semi-hard se-
curity by requiring only hardware connections to the monitor and removing
synchronization signals to the monitor. The monitor must be able to gather its
own state information to remove dependence of the monitor on the monitored
system. Two examples of this level of security are CoPilot [55] and Indepen-
dent Auditors [47]. Two examples of this are discussed in Section 4.3.1.2 and
Section 4.3.1.1 respectively.
Complete Security This level of security is the ideal secure case, used as a theo-
retical comparison point. In reality, such a monitoring system would have no
contact with the outside world, making it self defeating because it is unusable.
Mott notes that within many of these levels of security, there is a tradeoff be-
tween the security of the monitor and the ease with which state information can be
gathered from the monitored system [48]. One critical piece of information overlooked
by these categories is the trustworthiness of the information that the monitor is re-
ceiving. Although technically the monitor itself is not corrupted, the effects can be
equivalent. For example, a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Sys-
tem controlling critical infrastructure such as the electrical grid, could be manipulated
to perform undesirable actions, without ever compromising the SCADA System. This
can still be accomplished by an attacker who can only manipulate the information
being received by the SCADA System. For instance, if an attacker can manipulate the
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information feeding the SCADA System, telling it that there is a massive overdraw on
the electrical grid, they can affect SCADA System responses such as causing a rolling
blackout. This is accomplished without specifically corrupting the SCADA system to
do so. The SCADA System would respond correctly to the environment it believes
exists, not the actual environment. A simpler exploit corrupting the information be-
ing passed to monitors is a denial of service (DoS) attack. If the SCADA system
does not receive readings from sensors monitoring critical sections of the system, it
will be unable to respond to parameters out of acceptable ranges. This could quickly
compound into catastrophic failure.
Although this issue is acknowledged in relation to ID in a number of works
[79, 15, 55], little research has been found that delves into this aspect. Our research
explores this aspect of the monitor’s security. Rutkowska presents methods for cor-
rupting the memory access of the PCI Bus without effecting the processor’s access
to memory [63] which is discussed in more detail in 2.1.3.1. This exploit highlights
the importance of this aspect of classification for the security of the monitoring sys-
tem. Section 3.2.3 presents an independent axis for categorizing the security of the
monitor relating to the trustworthiness of the monitored data. This categorization
looks at whether the monitoring device relies solely on the component it attempts to
monitor or must trust intermediate components to pass it information. CoPilot, one
of the examples Mott identifies as being strict-hard security, is defeated by this attack
because of its security weakness on this new axis of categorization.
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2.3 Trusted Computing
This chapter concludes by discussing the concept of trust in computing. This
section looks at definitions of trust and a number of proposed requirements for achiev-
ing trust.
2.3.1 Trust Definitions. Significant work has gone into trying to define and
model trust in computer systems. Numerous models abound each with their own
take on how best to quantify trust: hTrust [10], VTrust [57], Secure Environments for
Collaboration among Ubiquitous Roaming Entities (SECURE) [9], security and trust
enhanced mobile agent (SATEMA) [18], an Architecture for Mobile Agents with Re-
cursive Itinerary and Secure Migration (MARISM-A) [59], and I-TRUST [72]. VTrust
is discussed in more detail, both due to the relative merit of the Trust Vector model
and Stevens’ work applying the use of trust vectors to the Cybercraft Initiative [70].
Ray and Chakraborty develop a Trust Vector model with three main components
of trust: experience (We), knowledge (Wk), and recommendations (Wr) [57]. Using
these vectors they define a range of trust from +1 (complete trust) to -1 (complete dis-
trust) with 0 representing no trust. Since these three vectors are used to represent the
entirety of trust in their model it holds thatWe,Wk,Wr ∈ [0, 1] andWe+Wk+Wr = 1.
To generate the overall trust of a remote agent we take the experience evaluation
(AE
c
B), the knowledge evaluation (AK
c
B), and the recommendation component (ψR
c
B)













B ∈ [−1,+1]. Their work also discusses a
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trust decay factor. As time passes, after the trust vector of a particular agent has been
evaluated, the level of trust becomes less and less certain since the agent is vulnerable
to compromise this entire time. One flaw in the equations for this degradation, is
that they do not take into account any level of confidence in the security of the agent
being trusted. It stands to reason that the better protected and secured an agent
is, the higher level of confidence that we can have on continuing it’s current level of
trust.
2.3.2 Roots of Trust. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defines the
concept of the root of trust as system components which must be trusted to guarantee
detection of compromise [24]. They present three common roots of trust in trusted
platform:
Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) This is responsible for providing the
basis for trusting integrity checks of the system and the continuous security of
the system.
Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) This is responsible for providing the basis for
trusting information stored by the RTM.
Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) This is responsible for providing the basis
for trusting the mechanism which allows reporting information stored by the
RTS.
Our SHI(EL)DS architecture makes advancements towards developing each of
these roots of trust in the system. Section 6.2.1.1 explores how this architecture
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provides these advancements and relates it to the development of a Cybercraft de-
ployment platform.
2.3.3 Requirements for Trusted Security System. Anderson proposes the
inclusion of a reference monitor as an essential element of a secure system model,
such as a reference validation mechanism [2]. Figure 2.4 displays the basic architecture
concept of a reference monitor. Three essential elements to the proper design of these
reference monitors are listed here.
Figure 2.4: Reference Monitor
Must be tamper proof To be able to guarantee the integrity of the reference mon-
itor it must be tamper proof.
Must always be invoked If the reference monitor is not always invoked, it cannot
guarantee accurate monitoring of a system.
Small enough to receive complete analysis and testing The reference monitor
must be simple enough to be able to prove that its design and operation are
correct.
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Our system makes headway towards each of these requirements, by designing
a security system which can maintain these requirements. Although the production
system will not be tamper proof or small enough to be completely tested, the physical
separation of the security system will harden its resistance to tampering and the
communication pathways between the two are simplified to the extent that complete
analysis might be achievable. The dedicated security also provides the ability to
always monitor its target, since the lack of resource conflict between the production
and security systems allows the monitor to always be invoked.
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III. Security Backplane Motivation
T
o motivate the need for a hardware security backplane we must first look at
hardware in security. Is it necessary? What advantages can be gained through
its use? What capabilities cannot be achieved without its use? What do we mean by
hardware security? What design requirements are necessary for hardware to enhance
current capabilities and achieve new ones? This chapter examines these questions
to develop a detailed understanding of using dedicated hardware for security. These
findings are used to examine a number of current and proposed security solutions in
the following chapter. Chapter V leverages the understanding gained here to develop
a hardware security backplane architecture, called SHI(EL)DS.
3.1 Research Hypothesis
Current computer architectures have been designed almost completely with per-
formance as the primary goal. Creating a viable security system for today’s computers
requires modification of the basic hardware architecture of these systems. By creat-
ing a separate, parallel security backplane with limited connections to the production
system this research demonstrates a system which provides necessary architecture
modification to enhance security while allowing the functionality and performance of
the production system to be minimally unaffected. This separation allows for signifi-
cant flexibility in the implementation of security response to data gathered from the
proposed hardware security monitors.
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3.2 Why Hardware?
Most current security systems for computers are based largely on software sys-
tems. Numerous flaws and vulnerabilities have been exposed and even exploited in
these different software solutions. Compromise of protected code via rootkits [39]
represent one of the most prevalent exploits. Recent work has begun exploring differ-
ent hardware-based approaches to security [11,54,23,47,48,55,81,67,82,22,28,26,8].
This research suggests that one cannot solely use software to protect software and
only hardware, coupled with software, can do that job successfully. Though a number
of advantages to hardware over software have been suggested, no research was found
discussing what precisely makes hardware a significant improvement over software
and just what capabilities hardware provides that software cannot. A number of key
advantages achievable through the use of hardware are:
Reduced Avenues of Attack Separate monitoring hardware can strengthen the
security of the monitor by reducing the extent of the coupling between the
security and production systems.
Ability to Gather Trustworthy Information Correctly designed hardware guar-
antees that the monitor receives valid data from the production system. This
cannot be accomplished with a standard software security solution, since it must
rely on underlying hardware components.
Additional/Different Information Available Mott’s research explores a number
of pieces of information which can be gathered through hardware primitives and
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leveraged to increase the overall security of the system [48]. These hardware
primitives include information such as the program counter, instruction traces,
and added visibility into memory.
Timeliness of Detection The ability to guarantee real-time detection, as defined in
Section 2.2.3, requires the ability to guarantee that the monitor will execute with
the ordering tb < tD(b) < tc. Work such as Williams’ CuPIDS [79], which at first
glance appears to be a software only solution, does in fact take steps towards a
hardware solution to achieve this ability. When CuPIDS is monitoring a process,
it runs on dedicated hardware, one of the processors in the multiprocessor system
which is a requirement for Williams’ work.
Physical Response Another advantage of dedicated hardware is the ability to pro-
vide a physical response. Although this idea falls outside of this research and
will not be further discussed here, the possibility for a physically destructive
reaction in response to compromise could yield added security. Although soft-
ware has the potential to destroy information, dedicated hardware can provide
autonomous, timely response not achievable through software. Research into
such dedicated hardware already suggests hardware-based destructive elements
such as the patent filed by Vatsaas and Erickson [76]. This patent suggests
responses to a stimulus such as providing an electrical charge and mixing chem-
icals to form a reaction. The proposed purpose of these responses is to “disable,
damage, or and/or destroy” the component being protected.
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The rest of this section develops justification for needing capabilities beyond
what software can provide and explore each of these advantages in greater detail.
It defines precisely what is required of hardware to overcome the vulnerabilities of
software and provide significantly improved performance.
3.2.1 Vulnerabilities of Software Security Systems. There are a number of
vulnerabilities inherent in software security. Two critical vulnerabilities are the in-
ability to guarantee real-time monitoring in standard commercial operating systems,
even on a multiprocessor system, and the inability to protect the integrity of the
security system once the production system has been compromised. The first vulner-
ability is evidenced by the fact that scheduling of processes on both uniprocessor and
multiprocessor systems does not make any guarantees on precise ordering or timing
of when a specific process gets time on a processor. Work such as Williams’ CuPIDS,
discussed in Section 4.3.2.2, changes this standard paradigm to guarantee monitored
processes run in lock step with the monitoring process [79] and overcome this first crit-
ical vulnerability of software security systems. Despite CuPIDS’ ability to overcome
this vulnerability, it cannot protect itself once the kernel has been compromised.
The specific point where software loses the ability to protect other software is
when faced with exploitation of a vulnerability in privileged code. Once an attack
can gain access through such a vulnerability, they have access to any piece of soft-
ware in the system and can modify both data and executable code. This allows for
changes in both user applications and the operating system itself, compromising the
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security of the security system itself. This can be accomplished through modification
to the security software itself or by modifying the operating system to interact with
the security software in another manner, such as reducing its privilege level. Note
that exploitation of vulnerabilities in privileged code provides two main avenues of
attack into the system. The more obvious method of attacking the security software
itself to degrade or interrupt its capabilities described above, but also corrupting the
information that is being sent to the security software.
This second issue is the general method that rootkits use to remain undetected.
They interpose themselves between processes by taking control when there is a library
function or system call. By controlling what information is passed back to the process
the rootkit can neutralize the security software without directly modifying it.
3.2.2 Advantages of Hardware. The vulnerabilities of software discussed
above show clear need for a security solution which can overcome these vulnerabili-
ties. Does hardware provide protection from these attacks? Not necessarily. Hardware
can provide this protection, but only if appropriately designed into the system’s ar-
chitecture. Two key factors in designing hardware which can enhance these areas of
security are where the security hardware connects to the system and how these con-
nections are made. Where it connect controls the trustworthiness of information as
well as influences the timeliness of detection. How the security hardware is connected
impacts the amount of information available to the security system and defines the
only avenues of direct attacks on the security system.
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3.2.3 Trustworthiness of Information. Although the need for accurate data
being received by the monitor is understood, there is no real framework for under-
standing what precisely is needed to accomplish this. Towards this end this research
defines a new axis categorizing the trustworthiness of the information being received
by the monitor. Although presented here towards the development of a hardware-
based security backplane system, this axis of trustworthiness stands as its own con-
tribution, which should be considered when attempting to provide an accurate and
secure monitoring device of any sort. This categorization sets important bounds on
what exactly affects the trustworthiness of the information.
Immediate Information (Figure 3.1) Immediate access to what is being monitored
insures the monitor is receiving true data. This immediate categorization rep-
resents a specific form of first-hand information where the monitor is inline,
directly between what is being monitored and its interaction with the system.
While this level of trustworthiness is certainly the most definitive method for
ensuring the monitor’s security, it leads toward a design with individual moni-
tors on every single hardware component, thus requiring a complete redesign of
all aspects of a system.
First-hand Information (Figure 3.2) This level of trustworthiness represents a
monitor that has direct access to the data being output from some device.
Depending on the specific design of the architecture being monitored, this level
of trustworthiness will likely be equivalent to Immediate Information. However,
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Figure 3.1: Immediate Information: Security Monitor placed inline between main
memory and the memory controller.
a shared bus architecture could be vulnerable to DoS exploit. This would be
accomplished in much the manner that someone would have trouble listening to
another’s conversation in a crowded room. For example, the PCI architecture
provides a scenario where data for each system is broadcast to all connected sys-
tems. If a security monitoring system is connected to the hub to take advantage
of this broadcast information it can be vulnerable to a DoS attack.
Figure 3.2: First-hand Information: Security Monitor placed on a shared bus,
vulnerable to Denial of Service from excessive traffic.
34
With First-hand Information, or Immediate Information, a monitor is guaran-
teed to receive accurate data. The quantization from Section 2.3.1 shows that
the only possible way for a monitor with worse than First-hand Information to
guarantee it receives accurate data, is for every device which passes information
to the monitor to hold a trust rating of +1. The potential vulnerability pre-
sented of a DoS does not stop accurate data from being presented, merely floods
enough information to the monitor so that it is unable to interpret the correct
data. The speed of the monitor as compared to the speed of the monitored
information transmission plays a large role in this vulnerability and can even
overcome it if the monitor can process information faster than it can be trans-
mitted. If the monitor can process the incoming data at the same rate as the
device it is monitoring, its monitoring still remains accurate, since a DoS attack
on the monitor would effect the production system in the same manner. With
the pre-knowledge of its operating speed compared to what it is monitoring, a
monitor can recognize a DoS situation against itself as the same DoS against
the production system component.
Second-hand Information (Figure 3.3) This level of trustworthiness encompasses
any monitor that relies on some intermediary mechanism, such as hardware or
software components, to pass it the data it is attempting to monitor. Each
additional mechanism relied upon reduces the trustworthiness into third-hand
information, fourth-hand information, and so forth. Each level having a con-
tinually lessening degree of trustworthiness. For simplicity this categorization
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groups all levels of trustworthiness that cannot guarantee accurate monitor-
ing into this category of second-hand information. Unless any and all mecha-
nisms being relied upon to pass the monitor data can be guaranteed secure, this
presents an avenue of attack for corrupting the monitor be feeding it false data.
Figure 3.3 presents a simplification of Figure 2.2. It shows a PCI-based memory
acquisition tool, such as CoPilot [55], that must trust the PCI bridge, the south
bridge, and the north bridge; trust which Rutkowska’s research demonstrates
as unwarranted [63].
Figure 3.3: Second-hand Information:
Adapting the quantization of trust described in Section 2.3.1 to mechanisms
within a computer system demonstrates the compounding problem of the trust-
worthiness of Second-hand Information. By assigning a trust value in the range
[−1,+1] to any mechanism that must pass information in a system it shows that
the further removed from First-hand Information a monitor becomes the greater
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the degradation of trust. Looking at the situation of Rutkowska’s attack [63],
by assigning arbitrary values of trust to the PCI bridge, the south bridge, and
the north bridge of +0.9 each, that is all are 90% trustworthy, the aggregate
trust degrades to 0.729, that is the monitor can trust that it receives accurate
information with 72.9% confidence. This example assumes a fairly high level of
trust for each component and still shows significant degradation. With trust of
80%, the aggregate trust reduces to only 51.2%. Note also that this example
assigns trust values at a high granularity and does not deal with the aspect of
the trust of each component on something such as a north bridge chipset.
It is this previously undefined axis of the monitor’s security which is being
exploited by Rutkowska’s attack. This system incorporates this by attempting to
ensure that the system is monitored predominantly by devices capable of receiving
First-hand Information. Two important things to note about this axis of security are
that 1) all software based security systems on a uniprocessor system are inherently
unable to achieve a level of trustworthiness better than Second-hand Information since
they must rely on data controlled by the operating system and 2) even software based
solutions designed to operate within a multiprocessor system, such as CuPIDS [79],
must still rely on the trustworthiness of main memory and therefore receive no better
than Second-hand Information. In order to ensure accurate monitoring, the monitor
needs to have access to at least First-hand Information of the data being produced,
any intermediate devices provide the possibility of the data being manipulated before
reaching the monitor. Therefore at very least monitoring or interaction points are
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needed at each of the bridges in the system, i.e., any device that passes information
from one part of the system to another.
3.2.4 Timeliness of Detection. Another aspect of monitor placement is the
speed with which a monitor can detect an attack. One of the areas where the speed of
a device far exceeds the speed of the buses which pass information to and from it is the
processor(s). To accomplish real-time monitoring as defined in Section 2.2.3, monitors
will need to be closer to the main processor than system bridges will allow. One clear
example of why this is true is an attack which resides purely in cache. This section
describes a theoretical cache attack in Section 5.1.1.3. Such an attack will be able to
do its damage before detection, since detection is only possible with access to a present
view of cache. Even accepting near real-time monitoring capabilities, Kuperman’s δ
value will be significantly smaller for a monitor which is located on-chip.
3.2.5 Hardware Primitives. The manner in which monitors connect to the
system plays a significant role in enhancing both the security of the production system
and the security of the CSM system. By limiting connections between the monitor
and production systems and remaining within Mott’s Semi-hard security level, the
only avenues of directly attacking the security system are the hardware primitives
that bridge the monitors and production system. As long as no primitives allow for
modification of the monitoring system’s code, a greatly reduced attack footprint for
the security monitor is maintained. At the same time, these hardware primitives
can offer direct access to information previously difficult to obtain and even provide
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access to information not accessible through any software methods. Mott presents a
number of hardware primitives that can be leveraged in [48]. The two main areas of
interest for creating hardware security (and security in general) have been attempts to
monitor processes running on the production system, mainly through various memory
introspection techniques [11, 54, 23], and monitoring the incoming network traffic as
it enters the system [67,82, 22, 28, 26, 8].
3.2.6 What Do We Mean By Hardware Security? To this point we have left
the definition of hardware security somewhat up in the air. All computer systems con-
tain a mix of hardware and software and only a limited amount is accomplished with
purely hardware. To create a security system purely in hardware would significantly
hamper the flexibility and modifiability of such a system reducing the number of future
attacks a system could potentially respond to. Solutions such as a field programmable
gate array (FPGA) can be used to extend software flexibility into hardware, though it
may require performance tradeoffs and is not pivotal to this aspect of the discussion.
However, a pure hardware solution is not the goal when talking about hardware-
based security. The key component of hardware-based security is the communication
between the production system and the security system. Whether a specific monitor is
pure hardware, a FPGA, or software running on some combination of hardware which
remains separate from the production system hardware what qualifies a security com-
ponent as hardware-based is that connection back to the production system. Note
that an important result of this definition is that a hardware-based security solution
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requires physically separated memory. This is not to say that pure hardware or at
least FPGA solutions will not be required in some instances to provide fast enough
response. Areas where high-speed detection is crucial will almost certainly benefit
from pure hardware solutions. One predominant example of this is the network IDS
field where research has shown benefits from hardware solutions [28, 8, 73, 22].
3.3 Specific Requirements for Achieving Benefits from Hardware
So far this research has discussed the different advantages of dedicated hardware
for security solutions and discussed what is required to achieve these advantages. This
section explicitly defines these requirements for dedicated hardware. By designing to
these requirements, it is possible to design a comprehensive security solution that
achieves the advantages of hardware previously explored. The SHI(EL)DS architec-
ture discussed in Chapter V presents such a solution. These requirements are:
First-hand Information of all monitored information: This level of trusted infor-
mation guarantees accurate monitoring of what is happening in the system.
Without this level of trusted information security solutions are vulnerable to
being denied access to the information or even fed false information. This
vulnerability provides a route to compromise the effectiveness of the security
system, without the need to compromise the security system itself.
Dedicated Monitors for parallel, concurrent monitoring: To protect against po-
tential timing attacks monitors must be able to run concurrently with what
they are monitoring to allow the possibility guaranteeing of Kuperman’s real-
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time detection. Any monitor which does not run concurrently with its target
must ensure that it runs often enough to be impervious to timing attacks. In a
software-based solution this becomes infeasible due to the performance penalty
of continuous context switching. Dedicated hardware monitors remove the bur-
den on production resources and keep performance degradation to a minimum.
Explicit Hardware Communication between the production and security sys-
tems: By limiting communication between the production and security systems
to hardware pathways, avenues of attack upon the security system are reduced
to these explicitly defined pathways. Without modifiable communication path-
ways, the ability to corrupt these pathways is reduced. These limited pathways
provide a clear set of attack avenues which can be understood and protected.
Dedicated Storage of security code and data: Without dedicated, separate security
storage software communication pathways remain present in the system. These
communication pathways represent a significant avenue of attack to be exploited.
Any software-based separation becomes vulnerable to a root-level compromise
of the production system. Separate storage which cannot be directly modified
by the production system provides a more reliable method of protecting the
security code and data.
Dedicated Security Processor for controlling and coordinating the security mech-
anisms: Though not explicitly a requirement for gaining security capabilities, a
dedicated security processor is included here for the coordination and commu-
nication abilities it can provide. This separate processor will allow for a secured
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security control center when coupled with these other requirements. It will pro-
vide the ability to modularly add security mechanisms into a security backplane.
An important aspect of this ease of modularity is the ability to combine both
network IDSs and host-based IDSs into a combined, complete IDS which can
leverage combined knowledge from each to provide more flexible and effective
response.
3.4 Towards a Hardware Security Backplane
There are a number of key goals and factors which led to the creation of the
hardware security backplane system concept. This section presents and discusses a
number of these points that make the backplane concept the best solution with the
current state of computer system architectures. Though other systems do provide
some advantages, this system provides a more comprehensive and complete set of
advantages to other systems, discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
Backwards/Forwards Compatibility By creating the bulk of the security system
out of band, with only hardware primitive monitors as the connection, this
architecture allows for little to no change to the software and firmware on a
system. This means that a system equipped with this security backplane would
be able to run the same code as a standard system without a security backplane.
This also means that future development does not need to account for the
backplane’s existence, thus providing a high level of transparency to developers.
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Modularity This backplane design provides an out-of-band system which connects
to the production system only through specific monitored points. The backplane
is designed to be capable of operating with only a subset of these monitors
active. If a specific system only has access to monitors of the memory address
allocation within the north bridge and the memory address requests on the PCI
bus it can provide simple comparison analysis to ensure PCI devices receive
the memory address they requested. If a specific system also has access to the
network interface, it can provide the ability to shut down this system’s network
communication when it detects that the system is potentially compromised.
It also provides for a method of linking the backplanes from a number of sys-
tems together in a network that is almost completely separate from the global
Internet like that of Figure 5.41. This creates a system which can be leveraged
in numerous ways. It can operate on a single or small number of systems, such
as computers serving as the gateway into an internal network or providing ex-
ternal services (webmail, remote desktop, etc.). It can also operate as an entire
network backplane to a server farm where individual backplanes can communi-
cate potential threats throughout this network and control access to potentially
compromised machines. This network level modularity and ways to leverage it
for numerous security enhancements are discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.
1The only path of attack from an external network to the backplane network would be through
a specific production system, through the hardware monitors of that system, through that specific
security backplane out into the rest of the security backplane network.
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Minimizing Impact By minimizing changes to the production system, redesign
costs are reduced. This includes both the time and money required for re-
design. The less modification required to the production system, the more
independent development of the production and security systems can remain.
The other aspect of impact is that of system performance. High-speed areas
of system architecture will need careful design to minimize fanout and possible
gate delays so as to keep these components operating within the correct clock
speed. In some cases, the impact can be reduced to almost zero by creating
a monitor which plugs into the system inline with a system bridge. In other
cases, significant impact on the production system design will be unavoidable
such as the inclusion of a monitor which would give First-hand Information
of a system bus, such as the IntelR©Front Side Bus (FSB) [30], to the security
monitor. Determining where monitors are placed within a system relies on a
cost-benefit analysis of the importance of information gained versus the extent
of the impact to the system. In cases where the impact is insignificant, monitors
which offer only a small benefit can still be realized. In those cases where the
impact is greater, such as First-hand Information capable monitors of proces-
sor(s) and/or memory, the hardware primitives that can be monitored will need
to be limited to only those which provide the optimal benefit.
Fits Design Requirements As discussed in Section 3.2, to create a hardware-based
security system with a minimal attack footprint, the operation of the security
system must be separated onto different hardware than the production system
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maintaining only the necessary hardware primitive connections. This backplane
design fulfills this need. The backplane architecture incorporates each of the
requirements presented in Section 3.3. Since separate hardware is desired for
the security system, this work attempts to only modify the production system
with the inclusion of monitors. Section 5.1 explores critical monitoring points
throughout the entirety of production systems and highlight specific hardware
primitives to aid in this monitoring.
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IV. Review of State of the Art Computer Security Solutions
H
aving presented requirements for hardware-based security solutions to over-
come the vulnerabilities of software solutions, we now review the state of
security solutions. We look at software, virtualization, and various solutions which
include hardware to varying extents. We evaluate these solutions against the different
advantages that the use of hardware provides. Although all of these advantages are of
interest, the Reduced Avenues of Attack, provided by separation of the security system
and the Trustworthiness of Information are two areas where most current solution
fall short. These solutions often do not manage to achieve First-hand Information.
When they do they still rely on the production system’s memory, leaving this avenue
of attack open.
4.1 Software Intrusion Detection Systems
Software security solutions abound both in the commercial market [43,52,66] and
the academic research community [78,25]. All of these solutions are vulnerable to the
weaknesses described in Section 3.2.1. For all their strengths as total system security
or network security systems, they are unable to guarantee the Trustworthiness of
Information and are vulnerable to any compromise of the production system. Despite
these weaknesses, there are a wealth of useful approaches and techniques that have
been explored in software. As explained in Chapter III, hardware in security does
not necessarily replace the need for software, but provides improved security for the
security system and new information to be used by the security system. This section
46
presents a select few software-based solutions that can be adapted to work with the
SHI(EL)DS architecture. Numerous other software security systems exist which also
share the potential to be adapted to the security architecture developed in Chapter V.
4.1.1 CDIS. Williams et al. develop a computer defense immune system
(CDIS), which uses an artificial immune system (AIS) to address two main concerns
of ID: the ever changing nature and the enormity of the network landscape [80]. This
research is designed to augment traditional signature-based detection systems. They
choose to implement an AIS due to the similarities between IDS structure and the
biological immune system of humans. They use a process called costimulation to re-
duce the false positive rate by only discarding incoming packets if multiple antibodies
detect it as non-self. The term non-self refers to any packet that is not considered
acceptable network traffic.
4.1.2 jREMISA. Haag et al. present work on a multi-objective evolution-
ary algorithm (MOEA) inspired by an AIS that has the name jREMISA (java-based
Retrovirus Evolutionary Multiobjective Immune System Algorithm) [25]. This work
combines work by Edge et al. [16] and Coello and Corts [14]. Their work leverages
the concepts of AISs and MOEAs to create an adaptive IDS which attempts to evolve
antibodies which attempt to maximize the detection of True Positives while mini-
mizing False Positives, as defined in Section 2.2.3. In Kuperman’s notation a True
Positive is defined as x ∈ B,D(x) = true. That is, some event, x, which is malicious,
is detected to be malicious.
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4.2 Virtual Machine-based Security and Separation Kernels
The virtual machine monitor (VMM) was first developed in the late 1960s as
an approach to multitasking on mainframe systems, and with the advent of modern
multitasking OSs fell out of use through the 1980s and 1990s [60]. With the renewed
and increasing popularity of the virtual machine (VM) in today’s market, for both
platform flexibility and security, research has begun to focus on the strengths, vul-
nerabilities, and feasibility of using VMs for security purposes. This section explores
elements of this research.
4.2.1 Virtual Machine Monitor Description. There are a number of security
enhancements inherent in the design of VMMs [58]. A VM running a mainstream OS
on top of a VMM has an extra layer of abstraction and protection. If the OS on this
VM is compromised by an OS specific attack, only that particular VM is corrupted.
An attack meant to compromise the entire system must be designed to bypass the
initial OS and exploit a vulnerability in the VMM and attack the underlying OS if
one exists. Robin and Irvine describe two basic classes of VMM: Type I VMMs and
Type II VMMs. Type I VMMs operate as the direct link to the hardware, functioning
as a stripped down OS and allocating resources to the different VMs running on it.
A Type II VMM runs on top of a standard OS as an application.
4.2.2 Rootkit Defense. Medley presents research into using hardware as-
sisted virtualization (HAV) to protect against rootkits [45]. The core of this research
revolves around creating a small dedicated Type I VMM which is simple enough to be
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designed securely. This VMM secures system resources by creating a new operating
mode. Using HAV, Medley proposes a system which leverages the new advantages
provided to remove most of the OS operation from root level without significantly
impacting system performance.
4.2.3 Terra. Garfinkel et al. present a Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
(TVMM) architecture which aims to allow a variety of applications, with varying levels
of security needs, to operate concurrently on a general purpose computer platform [19].
This TVMM, called Terra, operates as a Type I VMM. One of the key concepts which
separates Terra from a standard VMM is the inclusion of both Open-box VMs and
Closed-box VMs in the architecture design. An Open-box VM is the standard concept
of a VM with the VMM and underlying OS aware of the activities within the VM. A
Closed-box VM attempts to operate as a complete black box with regards to the rest of
the system, denying access to the underlying OS for inspection or modification. This
is done through encrypting all memory and storage for the Closed-box VM. Terra also
includes a management VM which provides the ability to fine tune how different VMs
are granted access to hardware. Garfinkel et al. identify a number of key strengths
to their architecture:
Isolation Applications on different VMs remain well isolated.
Extensibility Applications with significantly different security requirements can be
implemented concurrently.
Efficiency Virtualization has shown to have negligible impact on performance [27].
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Compatibility VMMs can run mainstream OSs such as Windows and Linux.
Security The simplicity of VMMs compared to an OS allows for the ability to have
higher confidence the security of the software.
They also identify three features which they claim are unique to their Terra
architecture. These features are described here:
Root Secure The inclusion of Closed-Box VMs, as described above, provide the
ability to run code that even the root administrator does not have access to.
Attestation Terra provides the ability to cryptographically authenticate a VM as
the source of information to other network systems. This authentication, called
attestation, provides information about every aspect of the source of information
from the hardware all the way up the software stack of the system. This ability
allows systems receiving information, with the ability to decrypt this technology,
from a Terra equipped system to make their own, informed decision on the
trustworthiness of the data received.
Trusted Path In order to build secure applications you must have a trusted path [42]
which Garfinkel et al. claim their TVMM provides.
4.2.4 Separation Kernels. Rushby presents research into separation kernels
which are a variant of VMMs [61]. The key differences of the separation kernel are
the ability of the kernel to provide varying hardware profiles to the different regimes
(Rushby’s term for the VMs) and the ability to emulate specific, limited hardware
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communication pathways. From this description, the Terra TVMM discussed above
is very similar to an advancement of the basic separation kernel concept.
4.2.5 Virtual Machine Monitor Vulnerabilities. There are a number of key
vulnerabilities in the design of VMMs. First and foremost, the VMM uses the same
hardware, so a compromise of any vulnerability in the VMM design can compromise
the entire system and all processes running on it. Second, new architectures allow
VMs direct access to hardware opening up avenues of attack which can bypass the
VMM, even if the VMM remains secure. Lastly, although not a vulnerability of
VMMs precisely, the possibility of virtual-machine based rootkits (VMBR) has been
demonstrated by King et al. with their SubVirt concept [34]. Rutkowska also presents
a potentially malicious VMM using AMD’sR©virtualization technology [64].
While many VMMs claim to improve their self-security (over that of a standard
OS) through simplifying the core kernel of code, none of them claim to achieve guaran-
teed secure operations. By shrinking the size of the VMM as compared to a standard
OS they are reducing the vulnerabilities, not eliminating them or even clearly con-
straining what precisely those vulnerabilities will be. In each of the VMM solutions
developed above, a compromise of the core of the production system still leaves the
security system vulnerable. Terra provides a high level of security between different
VMs through emulation of hardware communication pathways between them. This
security becomes compromised if the TVVM or the controlling VM become compro-
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mised. The system developed in Chapter V moves this protection mechanism into
actual hardware, further strengthening its security.
Hardware assisted virtualization (HAV) provides a number of performance ad-
vantages for running a VMM on a system. Both IntelR© [20] and AMD R©have [71] have
released architecture modifications to include HAV in order to support the growing
trend in virtualization. Although HAV provides performance advantages, it also opens
up additional avenues of attack. With greater process control of hardware, malicious
code which corrupts a process can achieve its intended affect more directly.
VMMs can also be used in a malicious manner. King et al. present their SubVirt
system which attempts to install a VMM underneath a targeted OS, encapsulating this
OS as a VM running on their VMM [34]. This virtual machine-based rootkit concept,
allows for their attack to very effectively hide from the production OS, while having
a high level of visibility and control over the now compromised system. Any software
security system operating on the targeted OS will have little to no ability to detect
this VMBR or defend against it. Properly designed hardware-based solutions can
detect against an attack of this nature, since it’s access to operations will not have to
pass through this VBMR to monitor the system, like a software-based solution would
have to.
Rutkowska demonstrates a hypervisor (VMM) that uses AMD’sR©Secure Vir-
tual Machine (SVM) to co-opt control of a system by shifting the host OS into a VM
running on her thin hypervisor [64]. This hypervisor, called Blue Pill, is only respon-
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sible for limited control of the OS. This allows Blue Pill to have very little impact
on performance and reduces the visibility of this hypervisor to detection techniques
possible detection techniques. Since a virtualization based rootkit does not modify
the BIOS, boot sector, or system files of the original host OS, Rutkowska claims that
Blue Pill, and other Type III Malware, are virtually undetectable. She admits that
it is possible for a system running on top of a hypervisor or VMM to detect that
this is true. She points out that detecting that there is a hypervisor underneath the
OS does not mean that one can detect whether or not it is a malicious hypervisor.
She also claims that even a complete kernel integrity scanner that could verify both
the static and dynamic regions of the kernel and able to detect Type I Malware and
Type II Malware could not detect her Blue Pill. Even with this impressive theoretical
verification tool, Type III Malware remains undetectable.
4.3 Hardware-based Intrusion Detection Systems
4.3.1 PCI Based Devices.
4.3.1.1 Independent Auditors. Molina and Arbaugh present indepen-
dent auditors that check the integrity of the filesystem to determine if an intrusion
has occurred [47]. A PCI card based coprocessor logs all changes to the filesystem
and performs auditing calculations in a personal computer architecture so as to en-
sure filesystem integrity. A policy file provides the basis for defining what files and
parameters are to be audited providing useful computer forensics capabilities. There
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work defines eight properties which must be accomplished by a device for it to be
considered an independent auditor
Unrestricted Access The auditor must have unrestricted access to devices to be
audited and used by the auditor.
Secure Transactions The auditor must must be able to reliably and securely re-
trieve data from the audited system.
Inaccessibility The audited system cannot have access to the auditor’s internal
components.
Continuity The auditor must begin running at system startup when the system is
still in a trusted state and remain in operation as long as the system is operation.
Transparency The auditors access to the system’s devices should be as transparent
as possible.
Verifiable Software The auditor’s software must be verifiably trustworthy.
Non-volatile Memory The auditor must be capable of maintaining information
through power failure or reboots.
Physically Secure The auditor needs to be physically secure.
This list of properties provides a good list of important elements for any hardware-
based security system. These properties, either in the form listed above or a similar
focus, are incorporated into the hardware security backplane system. These inde-
pendent auditors provide an interesting set of capabilities; unfortunately they fail to
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meet their second property, reliably and securely retrieving data from the audited
system, in their system design which Rutkowska’s attack demonstrates [63]. This
failure is in large part due to a lack of understanding in the trustworthiness of their
information source. By defining clearly this aspect of a security monitor’s security, as
Section 3.2.3 does, this research hopes to rectify this oversight. These independent
auditors do manage to enhance their own security through using limited hardware
pathways to connect to the production system.
4.3.1.2 CoPilot. CoPilot [55], developed by Petroni et al., is a coprocessor-
based IDS. This IDS monitors the integrity of the host processor’s physical memory
space and looks for changes such as the installation of known rootkits which com-
promise the host processor’s security. They assert that a coprocessor must meet six
criteria to monitor a kernel at runtime effectively:
1. Unrestricted memory access
2. Transparent to what is being monitored
3. Operate independently of what is being monitored
4. Capability to process large number of operations
5. Sufficient memory resources to contain image of clean host
6. Secure reporting of security system state
CoPilot attempts to meet these requirements as a peripheral component inter-
face(PCI) device. As a PCI card, its memory access is coordinated through the CPU
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and peripherals on the system buses, allowing CoPilot to monitor memory without
explicit communication with the production processor. This places CoPilot within
Mott’s tight-hard security category for security of the monitor. Despite this, Sec-
tion 2.2.5 shows that in can be rendered ineffectual because of its reliance on Second-
hand Information. While the integrity of CoPilot is not compromised by Rutkowska’s
attack, its ability to monitor memory is neutralized, producing a net effect similar to
an actual compromise of the CoPilot system.
4.3.1.3 Tribble. Carrier and Grand present another hardware-based
memory acquisition tool which also resides on the PCI bus [11]. This device provides
very similar capabilities to CoPilot by capturing volatile memory. An important
requirement of their system is that it must be installed when the system is in a
known good state so that it can establish a baseline for the system.
Since Tribble is a PCI-based device, it is yet another example of a hardware
security device which is vulnerable to Rutkowska’s attack, described in Section 2.1.3.1,
due to its inability to capture better than Second-hand Information. Tribble provides
itself with a high level of security by limiting communication pathways from the
production system to hardware-based monitors.
4.3.2 Complete Systems with Dedicated Hardware.
4.3.2.1 APHID. Hart presents an Anomaly Processor in Hardware
for Intrusion Detection (APHID) which uses co-processing ID to oﬄoad the security
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processing burden [26]. This research uses tightly coupled monitors with anomaly-
based detection to defend against attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS)
and buffer overflow attacks.
4.3.2.2 CuPIDS. Williams implements a CoProcessor Intrusion De-
tection System (CuPIDS) which leverages a processor in a multiprocessor system to
act in lock step with the normally functioning processor as the coprocessor [79]. Using
the uniform memory access (UMA) multiprocessor model, this system accomplishes
ID and security policy compliance monitoring (SPCM). Williams’ design allows for
the monitoring processor to access virtual memory, since it is tightly coupled to the
production processor, located at the same logical level. This access provides the
monitor with information of both kernel-space and user-space, where the PCI-based
solutions discussed previously can only access kernel-space.
This architecture requires an OS which is not compromised, since CuPIDS runs
within the framework of a single OS. The main functionality of CuPIDS are the process
pairs known as the CuPIDS Production Process (CPP) and the CuPIDS Shadow
Process (CSP). In order to minimize the performance impact, the CSP monitors the
CPP only at critical points which are inserted into the CPP based on events that
can be used to detect intrusion. The CSP is initiated first, followed by the CPP with
”hooks” from the CSP into the CPP’s virtual memory.
CSPs can be designed to utilize both anomaly-based detection and specification-
based detection. Detection happens quickly compared to other software-based security
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systems and has the ability to notify of a CPP compromise or block the CPP from
further execution. Due to it’s fast detection time and access to the CPP’s virtual
memory there is the potential for a block of memory to be copied when dangerous
system calls are made, so that damage done by a potential attack can be repaired.
The two biggest shortcomings of the CuPIDS architecture Williams’ identified
are performance degradation and vulnerability when the OS is compromise. Williams’
estimates a 15% performance hit from that of a system not being monitored. This
performance degradation is measured through a comparison of clock time, user time,
system time, and throughput. Due to CuPIDS running on a single OS, compromise
of the OS leaves the entire system vulnerable to compromise.
Despite being viewed as a purely software solution, the manner in which CuPIDS
is developed takes the first steps toward dedicated security hardware, by co-opting
a processor for security use. When a CSP is running, that processor is dedicated to
security purposes. Although it begins down the path toward hardware security, it
shares the same OS and the same memory as the production system. This leaves it
vulnerable to compromise if the production system is compromised.
Although as a software solution, CuPIDS cannot achieve anything better than
Second-hand Information, it relies on significantly fewer mechanisms than PCI-based
monitors. The tradeoffs between the two in terms of their own security is interesting,
since the PCI-based monitors receive Second-hand Information from a number of
hardware mechanisms, only one of which has a demonstrated compromise against
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it. When the CuPIDS system has a CSP set up and running it has hooks into the
CPP’s memory and must rely on the same hardware that the CPP is relying on for its
information. This monitoring however, only maintains an advantage over PCI-based
memory monitors with the assumption of a OS which has not been compromised, this
remains the most significant weakness of Williams’ work. Leveraging the other design
elements of CuPIDS while overcoming the limitation of its reliance on the production
OS will lead towards a formidable security system.
4.3.2.3 Security Enhanced Chip Multiprocessor (SECM). Shi et al.
present a similar IDS to CuPIDS with the most important difference being that SECM
includes a separate operating system for the monitor [65]. SECM also shares the Level
2 L2 Cache which allows the security system to monitor every production processer
request for data from memory at the cache level.
With a shared L2 Cache, SECM achieves Immediate Information of processes
executing on the production processor. Although SECM’s use of hardware enables
it to guarantee that it receives accurate information from production processes, the
security system code is still stored on the same hardware as the production system
providing a large avenue of attack. SECM attempts to reduce this vulnerability by
keeping the security kernel as compact as possible and reducing the privileges of the
production system. Since SECM has not been implemented in hardware, or compared
against a system that is not being monitored, the performance penalty of using this
security solution has not been fully explored.
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4.3.3 Network Hardware Intrusion Detection Systems.
4.3.3.1 Efficient Packet Classification Using FPGAs. Song and Lock-
wood present research into combining Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM)
with the Bit Vector (BV) algorithm to provide multiple matches at gigabit per sec-
ond (Gbps) speeds from the classifier of their network intrusion detection system
(NIDS) [67]. Their system, called BV-TCAM, uses separate, dedicated TCAM which
allows for the efficient execution of their matching algorithm. This system provides
continuous monitoring of network packets, but still requires access to information
stored in main memory. If their system’s access to main memory is degraded or de-
layed, the system becomes significantly less effective. Though not explicitly stated in
their work, their hardware seems designed to receive First-hand Information, allowing
it to guarantee it is monitoring the actual network packets entering the machine.
4.3.3.2 FPGA-based Content Addressable Memories. Bu and Chandy
present a NIDS which uses dedicated content addressable memory (CAM) to achieve
processing of incoming packets at 2 Gbps [8]. Their system uses Signature-based De-
tection by loading signatures into a CAM array and passing incoming packets through
one bit at a time. They use a keyword match array that keeps track of bit matches and
signals when full word matches occur. This process evaluates incoming packets within
a linear multiple of input stream size. This multiple is a constant dependent on the
number of keywords. Their work presents a clear example of dedicated hardware pro-
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viding significant improvements in the detection time of malicious packets, achieving
detection speeds more than capable of keeping up with today’s gigabit networks.
4.3.3.3 Reconfigurable Hardware-based String Matching. Hutchings
et al. present research into using FPGAs to perform string matching for network
ID [28]. Their research leverages compiling regular expressions into nondeterministic
finite automata (NFA) and implement directly onto FPGAs, instead of first converting
the NFA into a deterministic finite automata (DFA).
Their research presents impressive results compared to software-based network
ID, especially as the size of the regular expressions for string matching grow in size.
They manage to maintain relatively moderate CPU utilization and a fast response
time regardless of packet size, compared to software solutions which require increasing
levels of CPU utilization and continually degraded response time. The benefit that
hardware grants this security solution is predominantly a matter of the timeliness of
detection and the speed of response.
4.3.4 Security Mechanisms Assisted By Hardware.
4.3.4.1 Real-time, Parallel ID via Hardware-based Architecture. Mott
et al. present research into a number of hardware primitives designed to aid in real-
time, parallel ID [49]. Their research presents extensions of the CuPIDS architecture
focusing on improving real-time monitoring of the production processor unit (PPU)
through parallel ID using a shadow monitoring unit (SMU). The SMU snoops the FSB
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and directly monitors PPU state information. It also provides for direct control signals
back from the SMU to the PPU. Their early prototyping work is developed on FPGAs
with the envisioned solution designed to use either FPGAs or non-reconfigurable
hardware with dedicated software. Mott details a number of hardware primitives in
his thesis to be used for gathering context-rich state information [48].
Multi-context Hardware Monitors Provides the monitor the ability to distin-
guish between processes executing on the PPU.
Execution Policy Enforcement Module Designed to prevent malicious code from
executing.
Peripheral Access Control Enforces access to peripherals, keeping processes from
accessing unintended peripherals.
Asymmetrically Partitioned Main Memory Grants the SMU access to the PPU’s
memory while preventing the PPU from accessing the SMU’s memory.
MMU Co-opting Provides visibility into a process’s virtual memory space.
Monitoring Using Multiple MMUs Extends MMU Co-opting to be able to mon-
itor the virtual memory of processes not executing.
Though Mott’s work does not explicitly state the need for First-hand Informa-
tion, many of these monitors are designed to achieve it. Asymmetrically Partition
Main Memory starts down the path of dedicated storage for the security system,
though since it appears to be accomplished through permissions, not physical separa-
tion, there is still a potential avenue of attack on the security system exposed. This
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work has limited dedicated processing power and uses explicit hardware communica-
tion between the PPU and the SMU. Mott’s work meets most of the requirements
outlined in Section 3.3 for hardware-based security to provide superior performance
over purely software-based solutions.
4.3.4.2 Hardware-based Stack Protection. Exploiting weaknesses such
as a buffer overflow, one very common form of attack involves rewriting information
on the stack, such as a return address [53]. By overwriting a return address on the
stack with an alternate address, an attack can execute malicious, injected code. Lee et
al. propose a secure return address stack (SRAS) which is designed to defend against
this form of attack [38]. Another hardware solution, SmashGuard, is described by
O¨zdoganoglu et al. [54]. Both of these stack protection techniques utilize separate,
dedicated hardware storage which allows for increased security of the monitoring sys-
tem, since the production system cannot write to the SRAS. However, these systems
include the ability to store information in main memory if their dedicated memory is
unable to handle the depth of the return address stack. This provides a potential av-
enue of attack to systems using these security methods. By ensuring the stack grows
large enough to force a write to memory, malicious code can exploit this vulnerability.
These solutions gather Immediate Information, which guarantees that the monitor
received accurate data from what is placed onto the stack. Some form of hardware-
based stack protection should be included in any complete security solution. One of
these or a tailored solution provides an excellent modular addition to the architecture
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developed in Chapter V. To increase the strength of their security, their overflow
storage should be located in dedicated security system memory, not the production
system’s main memory.
4.3.4.3 Microinstruction-based Monitoring. Ragel et al. present re-
search into modifying microinstructions that implement high risk instructions [56].
This research leverages the microinstructions of the instruction set architecture (ISA).
These microinstructions are not accessible to the software programmer. Since multiple
microinstructions are used to achieve a single instruction from the ISA, modification
of the microinstructions is possible while maintaining ISA compatibility. They present
a number of examples such as buffer overflow attacks, fault injection attacks, and out
of bounds memory address access.
Buffer overflow attacks are prevented through a hardware-based mechanism
similar to that described in Section 4.3.4.2. Instruction path fault injection attacks
are monitored by comparing the instruction memory to what is actually fetched. Data
path fault injection attacks are prevented via a first in first out (FIFO) buffer which
stores the write-back address from the instruction decode state and compared to the
actual write-back location. Out of bounds memory address access prevention through
comparison against a particular memory range.
Ragel et al. report an average performance penalty of 1.93% on applications
tested and no greater than 15% overhead to area on-chip. They measure this per-
formance penalty as the percent decrease of the clock speed. Their research can po-
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tentially provide Immediate Information for specific aspects of processes on the CPU
which they monitor. It involves separation of monitoring hardware and uses the mod-
ification of microinstructions to make the modification transparent to the ISA. Their
system also implements a small amount of dedicated storage for the security system.
While the system makes a number of improvements through it’s dedicated hardware,
it requires significant change to the architecture on-chip and does not interface with
the rest of the system. Also, the modified microinstruction approach detects and
prevents processes from behaving other than they way they were designed. If the OS
becomes compromised, processes can be modified so that their new intended purpose
has malicious consequences without triggering a response from this security system.
4.3.4.4 Control Flow Monitoring. Zhang et al. present research into
control flow monitoring at the instruction level through modified hardware [83]. Their
research uses two main methods for monitoring proper branching. The first examines
the text of a process to understand all possible branch targets. The second involves
examining a process executing in a trusted state. Zhang et al. expand their work
to include monitoring of multiple branches for anomalous behavior detection among
other improvements [84].
The main drawback to these security efforts is the reliance on training the system
to each process that is to be monitored.
Arora et al. also present research into this field [4, 3]. Their work focuses on
monitoring the program counter PC, the instruction register IR of the instruction
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which is finishing, and the status information from the control unit of the pipeline.
They provide two control signals with their work: a stall and an invalid signal. They
aim their research at providing protection to three key properties:
1. Inter-procedural control flow
2. Intra-procedural control flow
3. Integrity of the executed instruction stream
Each of these types of monitoring receives Immediate Information of the PC, IR,
and control unit status through the use of dedicated monitors. The system also
incorporates both dedicated storage and utilizes hardware communication pathways
to gather data.
4.4 Non-detection Oriented Computer Security
All of the discussion so far has focused primarily on intrusion detection, i.e.,
response to an attempted attack upon the system. Another field of computer security
focuses explicitly on providing trusted modes of execution for software processes. The
most notable in this field is the IntelR©Trusted Execution Technology, formerly known
as LaGrande [32,31,33]. Trusted Execution Technology offers a number of capabilities:
• Protected execution and memory spaces to process sensitive data
• Sealed storage to protect data such as encryption keys
• Protected Input and Graphics through encrypted communication
• Attestation to provide assurances that a process is correctly invoked
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• Measured launch allows a higher level of assurance for platform configuration
verification
They make use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that provides dedicated
storage for encryption keys and establishes the root of trust for the system for attes-
tation purposes. While the Trusted Execution Technology provides many benefits to
the security of a system by providing dedicated storage, the technology is not designed
to handle ID tasks. Trusted Execution Technology only protects code developed to
utilize it, which leaves systems open to vulnerabilities from software that has not been
re-engineered to do so. Since protected code must be developed and employ the new
capabilities correctly, systems are also vulnerable to inexperienced programmers not
fully understanding what is required to invoke the Trusted Execution Technology and
provide their code with a trusted environment. Our work attacks security from the
detection and response angle, attempting to provide security to all processes running
on a system, regardless of how they were developed. This helps to remove the burden




his chapter develops the Secure Hardware-based Intrusion (Elimination, Lim-
itation, and) Detection System (SHI(EL)DS) architecture, exploring locations
where security hardware can strengthen the security of the system. This discussion
remains high-level, focusing on general architecture. It shows advantages which can
be gained through this architecture and ties the decisions back into the discussion of
the benefits of including dedicated hardware in security solutions from Chapter III.
Although numerous solutions were discussed in Chapter IV with varying levels of
hardware involvement, this architecture presents a complete architecture, combin-
ing strengths from numerous different security solutions and attempting to overcome
weaknesses present in each. Although the SHI(EL)DS architecture does not represent
an impenetrable security system, it brings significant progress to a number of key
vulnerabilities that plague current software solutions.
Dissecting our SHI(EL)DS acronym for understanding what at first seems to
be nothing more than semantic trickery to create a good acronym yields key insight
into the goals and capabilities of our proposed system. The secure hardware-based
intrusion detection system all holds clear meaning related to our research efforts: we
are attempting to utilize hardware to create a more capable and secure IDS. Though
the term intrusion prevention system (IPS) is commonly used to refer to systems
which do more than simply detect intrusion, the term prevention tends to indicate
that security systems will proactively defeat all threats. We use the term elimination
to include both proactive and reactive defeat of threats. An important capability
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that our security backplane attempts to provide is the ability to deny a corrupted
peripheral access to the system or even entire corrupted system from access to the
rest of the security backplane equipped network. This limitation of an intrusion which
cannot be completely eliminated, potentially allows a system to remain operable while
containing the intrusion.
5.1 Critical Monitoring and Interaction Points
This section explores critical monitoring and interaction points in IntelR©and
AMD R©systems since they are two of the most dominant hardware architectures de-
ployed today. Despite the specifics of other architectures being different, the more gen-
eral concepts can still be extrapolated from this research. Although much of the overall
architecture design between IntelR©and AMD R©are very similar, there are a number of
key differences pertaining to AMD’sR©development of the HyperTransport BusR©. This
section begins by discussing the critical locations in the IntelR©Architecture and then
present the differences required by AMD’s HyperTransport BusR©. In the long term,
the AMD R©focused information will be more representative of how this system would
be deployed, since Intel is moving away from their current shared bus architecture
towards an architecture similar to that of AMD’s HyperTransportR© [29].
Before identifying critical points, criteria for choosing what effective monitoring
and interaction points should accomplish must be defined. Ideally, all information
within a system would be monitored in real-time and guarantee that what each device
is doing is what the monitor sees. Although this can be accomplished by modifying
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every single component within the system architecture, it would be unrealistic in
terms of both the cost and the obtrusiveness into the system. A number of key
factors important to identifying critical points are presented here.
1. Value and accuracy of monitored information
2. Timeliness of detection
3. Obtrusiveness into operation
4. Impact on performance
5. Cost of integration
Each of these key factors maps back to the advantages gained through hardware
and the justification for developing a security backplane architecture. New hardware
primitives must meet the criteria for presenting trustworthy data, by providing at
worst First-hand Information about the system and that this information can be
leveraged to increase the capabilities of the security system. As these goals are pur-
sued, care must be taken to examine the tradeoff between what a monitor provides
and the negative impact it has on the system. Any interaction point which modi-
fies the general operation of the production system or presents a serious performance
degradation must present substantial gains to justify inclusion. Large changes to the
operation of current devices in the system can quickly make this too device specific
and cost prohibitive. If this system causes a significant performance degradation there
will be great resistance to adoption of this system since very few people are willing
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to trade lower performance for increased security unless there is a large disparity in
favor of the increased security.
5.1.1 Basic PCI-Express Era Intel System Architecture. Figure 5.1 presents
a general layout of a desktop/server computer architecture. Although the specific
details of what devices are attached in a system vary greatly, the general architecture
remains fairly consistent.
Figure 5.1: General Intel Architecture with PCI-Express
5.1.1.1 Northbridge. The northbridge of a system connects the pro-
cessor(s), memory, and PCI Express slots. One of its key components is the memory
controller. It also connects the rest of the peripherals attached to the system in-
directly through the southbridge. Any communication between the processor(s) or
memory and the rest of the system passes through the northbridge. This means that
in order to gather First-hand Information from either the processor(s) or main mem-
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ory monitors cannot wait until after this data has passed through the northbridge to
monitor it.
5.1.1.2 Southbridge. Likewise, the southbridge connects I/O devices
and other peripherals such as PCI devices back to the rest of the system. Although
the potential impact on the system is less since these devices do not have as complete
access to the core of the system, the potential exists for the southbridge to corrupt
information being passed to or from any of these peripherals.
5.1.1.3 Processor. Above cited communications between the proces-
sor(s) and the rest of the system as partial reasoning for the northbridge as a crit-
ical monitoring point; however, due to the ability for malicious code to exist solely
within cache, even monitoring the northbridge does not provide First-hand Informa-
tion about the processor(s). Petroni et al. allude to the possibility of such an attack,
but do not explain how such an attack would be accomplished [55]. Although no
known instances of such an attack exist, the possibility for it does exist. If an at-
tacker were to successfully inject a compact piece of code, which contained a polling
loop to keep its utilization high, into the instruction stream it is potentially possi-
ble to keep this code in a processor’s cache at all times. This code would remain
their so long as it can maintain control of that processor [77]. To keep this attack
undetected, another device, which does not participate in cache snooping, must re-
pair the memory location that first allowed the attack. A peripheral can make this
memory change without trigger a cache flush. This erases the evidence of the attack
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from memory, hiding it’s existence from current memory monitors. While flushing the
cache will defeat this exploit, excessive flushing of the cache will create a significant
performance degradation and must be balanced against the potential benefit. Even
if only temporary, this theoretical attack demonstrates that at least until the cache
is flushed, the northbridge does not receive accurate information.
In addition to this issue, the speed difference between the processor(s) and the
northbridge provides windows of vulnerability even if lack of First-hand Information
were not an issue. Furthermore, as Mott discussed [48], there are numerous pieces of
information which can be useful for security purposes which are not currently made
available off chip such as the program counter and instruction trace.
5.1.2 Differences in AMD Systems. The critical difference in AMD’s archi-
tecture is the Hyper Transport (HT) Bus. HT changes the pathway for communica-
tions between the processor(s) and main memory, shifting northbridge functionality
on-chip. The memory controller being on-chip allows for greater speed and integra-
tion. What is important to note here is that the need for on-chip monitors is even
more prevalent within an AMD system since monitoring of the memory controller is
crucial for maintaining First-hand Information of memory.
5.2 Security Backplane Architecture
Having explained the need for dedicated security hardware and presented the
advantages of a security backplane system over other hardware options in Chapter III,
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this section presents the details of the backplane architecture. This discussion begins
at a high level, leveraging the discussion of critical monitoring and access points, to
identify the general areas which this system will connect to a production system.
Figure 5.2 presents this overall system design with red shadows representing loca-
tions where monitors and interaction points are located and red lines representing
communication paths between the elements of the security backplane.
Figure 5.2: High-level Hardware Security Backplane Architecture Implementation
Design
5.2.1 SHI(EL)DS Components and Monitors. Security monitors will be lo-
cated at each of the critical interaction points discussed in Section 5.1 and connected
to a main security controller. This controller will be responsible for policy decisions,
security system communications, and implementing security updates. The monitoring
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locations provide insight into numerous aspects of the system not previously moni-
tored. This section presents a more detailed view of monitor placement within the
system.
5.2.1.1 Security Controller. The security controller is intended as a
main processor for the security backplane architecture. This processor extends the
capabilities of Mott’s shadow monitoring unit [48] to include a number of additional
features. Mott’s SMU is responsible for performing monitoring of memory, via the
front-side bus, and monitoring of CPU state information exposed by his architecture.
SHI(EL)DS security controller is designed to coordinate between the different security
elements monitoring different system components. It also is responsible for managing
information passed from the network backplane into the system and coordinating local
security policies. This coordination of local security can include passing necessary
information between components as well as enabling and disabling components to
balance security needs with power consumption and performance degradation.
To enable monitoring of processes’ memory, Mott presents a non-uniform mem-
ory access (NUMA). His NUMA architecture is designed to limit the visibility of the
production processing unit into the SMU’s memory space. This research proposes
improving on the security of the memory space dedicated to running SMU software,
by including separate dedicated memory for the security system. Mott’s proposed
NUMA architecture must rely on configurable data available during a system’s boot
process. This presents a possible avenue of attack into the SMU’s exclusive memory.
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By completely separating the security system’s memory from the production system’s
memory, this avenue of attack is removed.
5.2.1.2 Processor State Monitors. Mott proposes exposing the pro-
gram counter and the process identifier (PID) to aid in enforcement of execution
policies and control peripheral access on a per process basis. These concepts are dis-
cussed in more depth in his thesis. SHI(EL)DS includes monitors to expose both of
these signals. The monitors discussed in the following section give us the ability for
physical memory introspection, however, the ability to examine virtual memory can
provide valuable insight into a process’ execution. The memory management unit,
which is responsible for the translation from virtual to physical memory, is one of the
crucial bottlenecks in a system. Due to its highly specialized and optimized design,
modification of the MMU is impractical. However, we do not need to modify the
MMU to determine the link between a virtual address and the corresponding physical
address. Instead, a monitor that exposes the address sent from the processor to the
MMU is provided. Since this monitor is completely passive it avoids negative impact
to the MMU’s performance. The only performance consideration for the capturing
of this information is fanout created by the added wire and a simple buffer. Once
the virtual memory address is exposed the security system must associate it with the
physical address passed out of the MMU.
Mott presents work towards gaining access to virtual memory. He proposes two
methods of achieving this: one that requires co-opting the MMU and another that
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utilizes multiple MMUs on his SMU. Modification to the MMU presents significant risk
to the performance of this system bottleneck. Due to this risk, this concept is designed
to avoid interfering with the design of the MMU completely. The result is a focused,
limited view into virtual memory that can be achieved without risk of compromising
the performance of the production system. This provides a reduced capability to
that provided by Mott’s research, but also reduces impact to the production system.
Though synchronizing the monitored virtual address with the monitored physical
address for association will be a somewhat complex task, there is no increase to
the bus traffic through this monitoring technique. If the security system has some
knowledge of the operation of a production system process and its proper execution,
it can detect attempted access to sections of code that are not meant to be executable.
Mott’s multiple MMU concept shows promise for the capabilities it offers, but
contains one significant drawback: high utilization of the memory bus. This bus is
one of the bottlenecks in current computer architecture design. Though his research
addresses this aspect, it is still an issue. Flooding this bus with memory access re-
quests from multiple MMUs will present a significant risk of performance degradation.
As production systems utilize more processors in their design the contention for this
bus will increase. Any reduction in required access to the memory bus will bene-
fit performance. Although the primary factor in motivating a completely separate
memory for the security processor is increased security, this feature pays dividends in
this situation also. Memory access by the security controller for its own code utilizes
a separate bus, relieving some of the congestion present on the production system’s
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memory bus. This reduces the impact of the security system on the performance of
the production system.
Note that exposing new information on the processor will require dedicated pins
to pass the information off-chip to a dedicated security bus. Alternatively the security
controller processor could be integrated into the main chip. This would still require
dedicated pins to connect to a security bus passing information back from other
monitored components in the system. Figure 5.3 displays these monitors as well as
the monitor from the following section that provides access to physical memory. The
virtual and physical addresses that are gathered by the two monitors are associated
by the security controller providing focused visibility into virtual memory space. The
dotted line denotes what is included on the main chip in current AMD systems.
Figure 5.3: Processor primitives, virtual address, and physical address are all mon-
itored and fed to the security controller.
5.2.1.3 Northbridge Monitors. The northbridge connects a number of
components of the system together. It passes information from the processor, main
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memory, the southbridge, and key performance critical devices such as the graphics
processing unit (GPU). One of the critical components of the northbridge is the
memory controller. The memory controller bridges the processor(s), main memory,
and the rest of the system. This presents us with a question of where precisely to
monitor the memory controller and how to connect to it. Monitors can be placed
inline between the memory controller and memory to provide Immediate Information
of what is being transferred to and from the memory controller. This monitor can
also be placed to snoop the memory bus, achieving First-hand Information. Since
the memory bus is not a shared bus architecture, First-hand Information provides
equivalent reliability to Immediate Information.
Another important monitor to place on the northbridge is one that has visibility
into the memory-mapped I/O (MMI/O) registers. In AMD R©systems these registers
are responsible for mapping memory requests to I/O space. Since the processor only
accesses these registers when specifically intending I/O interaction and peripherals
base their lookup purely on address, this provides an opening that can provide dif-
fering interaction for the processor and peripherals [63]. This is the corruption of the
northbridge that Rutkowska exploits to defeat hardware-based memory acquisition
solutions such as CoPilot [55]. By monitoring the values of these registers this moni-
tor will have visibility into attacks that attempt to cover a portion of main memory
from peripheral access.
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5.2.1.4 Southbridge Monitors and Interaction Points. Since the south-
bridge is responsible for the bulk of I/O communication it is an ideal place to add
isolating points that are capable of shutting off peripherals. Section 5.3.4 describes
such a capability in more detail, using firewire as an example. Monitors on the south-
bridge observe the memory-mapping registers to ensure proper routing of information
to and from I/O components.
5.2.2 Security Backplane Communication.
5.2.2.1 Internal. To allow separate elements of this security backplane
to operate together, the system requires dedicated buses to transmit data between
them. This addition, though logically easy to accomplish since there are plenty of bus
standards available to choose from, will however be one of the most intrusive elements
in a commercial product. It almost necessitates the need for motherboards specifically
designed to accommodate this system for different elements of the security backplane
to communicate with each other. Although the potential does exist to create plug-in1
devices which reside between the different devices and their motherboard connection
which contain their own ports for cables to connect them, this will quickly clutter the
system and potentially lead to unacceptable slow down in some instances. This plug-
in methodology does provide a potential route for implementing a complete system
prototype more quickly than a system which requires extensive modification to a
1To include solder-on devices as well as explicit plug-in devices.
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standard motherboard. Details for a proper implementation of a system prototype
are discussed in 7.2.1.1.
5.2.2.2 External. Communication between different system’s security
backplane is accomplished through the use of a dedicated security network interface
card (SNIC). This SNIC extends the single system security backplane into a backplane
running through an entire security network, such as for a server farm. The security
backplanes communicate with each other information such as the makeup of network
traffic to the production system and that a specific system is assumed compromised.
This provides a number of increases to the inherent security of a server farm. A
system which becomes compromised normally becomes an avenue of attack into the
entire network, but by connecting the network through a separate security backplane
network a system which is identified to be compromised can be isolated from the
network by instructing each system to reject packets from the compromised system.
Another aspect of external communication within the SHI(EL)DS architecture
is the ability to share information of attacks between different systems within the
network being protected and use this aggregate knowledge to better understand the
extent and goals of attacks. While a single system network IDS can gather only
limited information about what is transpiring on the network landscape, a network
interface based IDS is able to grab a broader and more useful picture of attempted
attacks [13]. The backplane architecture expands upon this ability by being able to
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leverage communication between all protected systems within a network to increase
the level of detail that can be gathered on attempted compromise.
Figure 5.4: Depiction of a separate Security Network connecting a number of sys-
tems all equipped with the Hardware-based Security Backplane
An alternate method of communicating with external sources in a more remote
environment, where we might not have full control over the network a system is on,
is through the use of specialized hardware placed on the NIC. This hardware would
be responsible for interpreting specific commands meant for the security backplane.
These commands would be securely sent through the use of a encrypted protocol to
transfer data from a remote source to the system. This concept can aide in developing
a remote Cybercraft deployment platform, discussed further in Chapter VI. When
the NIC is modified to provide a special communication pathway to the security
backplane, the potential exists for relatively secure communication being passed to
the security backplane from a remote source. The level of this security is critically
dependent upon the security of the encrypted data it receives. This alternate method
is crucial in any environment where we do not have the physical security or capability
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to run a secondary network connection to the system. While a system without physical
security is more vulnerable than a physically secured system, this security backplane
still improves upon security. This improvement is due to the only interaction with the
security backplane being through the network connection. By requiring knowledge
of both the update protocols and the specific encryption methods and keys used to
protect communication to the system, the main avenue of attack into the security
system through the NIC is defined.
5.3 Capabilities
5.3.1 Directly Monitor Memory. One of the most core, important capa-
bilities that a security system must have is the ability to monitor First-hand Infor-
mation from main memory. Since current architectures allow memory access from
peripheral devices, avenues of attack exist to compromise a system without running
code on the processor. This is accomplished through peripherals uses direct memory
access (DMA). By adding hardware that directly monitors the memory controller,
be it on-die or on the northbridge chipset, this system guarantees that the monitor
feeds accurate information about what is stored in and requested from memory to
the security system. Figure 5.5 shows a notional example of Rutkowska’s attempted
subversion of hardware on a system protected by the SHI(EL)DS architecture. Since
the monitor accesses the communications between main memory and the memory
controller, regardless of where information is passed by the memory controller, the
monitor will accurately see the information being passed out of memory and know
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where the memory controller is directing the information. This is shown in Figure 5.5
by the security monitor covering the northbridge, depicted in red.
Figure 5.5: Hardware Security Backplane Response to Rutkowska’s Hardware
Based RAM Acquisition and PCI Bus Access
Figure 5.3 shows a more detailed view of a monitor gathering information di-
rectly from the memory bus. Since the monitor sits on the memory bus, it can provide
real-time monitoring of memory. To ensure real-time monitoring the monitor and the
bus connecting to the security controller must operate at least as fast as the mem-
ory bus transfer rate. Note that this ensures only real-time monitoring. Real-time
detection, as defined by Kuperman in Section 2.2.3, can only be achieved if the secu-
rity controller can analyze the monitored memory and detect malicious code before
it compromises the system.
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5.3.2 Towards Reliable Detection of Type III Malware. Rutkowska claims
her Type III Malware is virtually undetectable since it does not modify the OS or
VMM running on the system in any way. Therefore, even if both static and dynamic
verifiers of the system were created, they would report a clean system. To overcome
this ability to hide Type III Malware, the security monitor must be able to ensure
that it has visibility into the entirety of the physical systems memory. This is a
capability provided by the SHI(EL)DS architecture. Although this system provides
this essential requirement for detecting Type III Malware, a complete verifier must be
established at this level as well. Since verifiers to detect both Type I Malware and Type
II Malware are not yet fully realized, a verifier that can detect Type III Malware is
not yet a priority. However, more systems are being equipped with hardware assisted
virtualization and utilizing VMMs. This will almost certainly lead to the use of Type
III Malware. This architecture provides the necessary platform to develop a verifier
to detect this type of malware by guaranteeing an accurate view of memory. A verifier
built without the guarantee of an accurate view of physical memory cannot reliably
identify Type III Malware since the verifier can be running inside of a hypervisor.
5.3.3 Ensure Peripheral Memory Request Matches Address Provided. The
monitors depicted in Figure 5.5 also present another unique capability. By moni-
toring peripheral buses and the MMI/O registers on the northbridge this monitor
can compare the memory address requested by a device, such as a PCI card, to the
memory ranges mapped back towards I/O. If the comparator determines that a pe-
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ripheral requests a memory location mapped back to I/O space it detects an attempt
to mask memory. Security system can respond by repairing MMI/O registers affected
or forcing peripheral request to actual memory.
Figure 5.6: Comparator ensures that I/O memory request is not masked by MMI/O
manipulation.
5.3.4 Isolation of Components and Systems When Compromise Detected.
By using simple fast transistor switches, controlled by the security system, each mon-
itoring point can achieve the ability to shut off access on a temporary basis. An
example where this capability provides added security is shutting off a specific pe-
ripheral that is attempting to compromise a system such as Rutkowska’s avenue into
the system for her exploit described in Section 2.1.3.1. Upon detection of Rutkowska’s
attack the security system sends a control signal to the transistors inline with each
wire of the firewire port in question. Once the attack is detected, this control sig-
nal can be asserted within a clock cycle and the associated wire delay. The critical
component in the speed of this isolation is the time to detect the attack.
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When no attack have been detected from a specific peripheral the control signal
remains de-asserted. A transistor with rise and fall times in the picosecond range will




This concept also extends to the security network backplane level. If a system
in the network is recognized as compromised it can be isolated from the production
network in a number of ways. Other systems in the network can be instructed to ignore
all data being sent from this machine, protecting the compromise from spreading to
other machines in the network. The control center, discussed in Section 5.3.7.1, can
also inform the local backplane of the compromised system to respond locally to the
threat, even if the local backplane had not previously detected a compromise on its
system.
5.3.5 Verifying Integrity of Component Firmware and Boot Information.
Rootkits such as SubVirt, discussed in Section 4.2.5, gain control of a system before
the OS has loaded and insert their VMM so that the OS runs inside of it. Research of
this nature motivates the need to be able to verify the BIOS and firmware for system
components has not been corrupted for an attack such as SubVirt. Having hardware
monitors that are not modifiable by the production system located throughout the
system provides a tool with which to perform this verification. The security backplane
provides a high level of assurance that it cannot be modified by malicious code on
the production system. This assurance can be leveraged during startup as a tool
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to examine components firmware and boot information. A hash of proper code can
verify that these devices have not been corrupted.
5.3.6 Combining Network Intrusion Detection and Host Intrusion Detection.
Combining the knowledge gathered from the two main categories of IDS provides
unique opportunities for aiding in the protection of the system. Each provide the
other with information about the current state of the system which can be leveraged
by the other to improve its security response.
5.3.6.1 Leverage Network Intrusion Detection Information for Host In-
trusion Detection. Depending on the strictness of network ID filters, the number
of potentially malicious packets of information passed into the system varies. The
tradeoff between True Positive rates and False Positive rates has been reduced by
work such as [25], but still remain a significant issue. One possible avenue of further
reducing this tradeoff is to identify potentially malicious packets, which the system
does not have a high confidence of being malicious, and pass them into the produc-
tion system flagged as potentially malicious. The host-based ID effort can leverage
this information to tighten or loosen the specifications defining proper and improper
behavior in the system.
5.3.6.2 Leverage Host Intrusion Detection Information for Network In-
trusion Detection. While the network ID can provide useful information to the
host ID, the opposite is also true. If a host IDS recognizes that malicious code has
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attempted to compromise some aspect of the production system, it can communicate
this information to the network IDS, providing it concrete knowledge that malicious
packets escaped detection. By having a time window of when a compromise occurred,
these packets can be reexamined more in depth to find the specific offending packets.
Without this knowledge, the network IDS has little feedback into the quality of its
detection. Any increased feedback on the effectiveness of the network IDS provides
added ability to tailor the detection process to be more accurate for the specific system
it is attempting to protect.
5.3.7 Addition of Dedicated Systems to the Security Network. This net-
worked backplane allows for systems to be connected through their regular NIC for
purposes such as:
5.3.7.1 Control center for setting policies and updating the security back-
plane. Creating a security backplane that uses dedicated hardware to separate itself
from the production system creates the need for an interface into the security system
that does not rely on the production system. One method of accomplishing this is
including a system attached to the network backplane to be used as a control system.
This control system can be designed to allow a user interface into the state of the
security system across the entire network. It provides a convenient, powerful interface
to the security system without creating new avenues of attack into the system other
than an attacker gaining physical access to the control center machine. This control
center can be utilized to load the signature of a newly discovered rootkit into each
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system in the SHI(EL)DS network. The local security system on each machine can
then use it’s direct memory monitoring capability to examine physical memory for
this signature. This control center can also be used to upload new specifications or
policies in response to outside events. For example, if the an Air Force base utilizing
this system were to change from Infocon Alpha to Infocon Delta, this policy change
could be fed through the control center to each SHI(EL)DS equipped system. Each
system and backplane component can have a tailored response to this policy change.
Systems acting as gateways to external networks can be updated to allow almost no
network traffic, where systems not exposed can have less drastic responses.
5.3.7.2 Dedicated processing power for network based ID with data from
each system. The processing power of additional computer systems attached to the
network security backplane can be employed in a number of ways. By each system’s
security backplane transmitting suspicious packets to a central source, the information
can be examined by a more robust network IDS located there, which has the added
knowledge of network traffic to each individual system in the security backplane net-
work. This can be done to create a central network IDS to govern internet access
or combined as a second layer to work on top of more typical IDS. One advantage
this has over a typical network IDS is the added security the network level systems
have. This extra security is provided by the systems not being accessible by external
Internet sources, except through a compromise of the local SHI(EL)DS architecture.
Network IDS must balance their True Positive and False Positive rates when detect-
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ing potentially malicious packets and perform the entirety of their decision process
fast enough to block what they identify as malicious (within Kuperman’s Real-time
Detection). By creating a second-level to the IDS, this demanding timetable can
be relaxed, allowing the second-level system to perform significantly more in depth
analysis of the potentially malicious packets. This relaxation is created through a
restrictive first-level classifier that is biased towards producing positives. This helps
to increase the True Positive rate, but also incurs a higher False Positive rate. This
first-level classifier still requires a quick response time. However, these potentially ma-
licious packets can be sent to the central processing location where this more in-depth
analysis will occur. Packets identified here as non-malicious can be transmitted back
to their respective production system. Although there is significant delay added to
the time for these packets, the automated second-level identification of False Positives
remains many orders of magnitude faster than passing potentially malicious packets
to an operator such as a network administrator.
Appendix A contains an extension of the jREMISA research that provides a
proof-of-concept for this two-layered approach. This proof-of-concept takes a standard
jREMISA learning run with a comparatively high True Positive and False Positive
rate and flags each potentially malicious packet to be fed into the second-level. At
this second-level the jREMISA learning process is run to create detection antibodies
that focus on the differences between only those packets identified as potentially ma-
licious at the first-level. Appendix A presents a short comparison between a standard
jREMISA solution and this two-layered solution using jREMISA at both levels. While
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this proof-of-concept provides only a small improvement, quantified in Appendix A,
it achieves this without any increase to the allowable processing time. Using a dedi-
cated processor attached to the network security backplane would allow for not only
increased processing time, but also significantly more storage for antibody definitions.
This would help to increase the resolution of detection. The network SHI(EL)DS ar-
chitecture provides a significant storage increase due to the ability to dedicate an
entire system, or cluster of systems if necessary, to provide this increase. Such a
system could easily achieve Terabytes of storage, though the more this increases the
greater the computational time of the second-level will need to be.
5.3.7.3 Storage location with data collection for forensics. Although
this capability is beyond the scope of this research, the networked security backplane
provides valuable options to forensic capabilities. Tuting and Williams [74] explores
this capability, discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.3. The key aspect of this
capability is the ability to leverage a large amount of dedicated storage to record the
desired forensic data.
5.4 SHI(EL)DS’ Weaknesses
Despite the significant improvement offered by this architecture, it is not a
perfect solution. This section presents a number of negative aspects of this system
and vulnerabilities not addressed by the hardware-based security solution.
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5.4.1 Physical Security. While one of the key improvements this security
architecture has provided is towards the security of the security system, it is important
to note that the architecture is not an impenetrable security system. One clear
example of this is the physical security of a system equipped with SHI(EL)DS. As
with any computer system, if an adversary can physically manipulate the system,
security becomes all but impossible to maintain [17].
5.4.2 Design and Implementation Cost. Although this design focuses on
minimizing changes to the production system, almost every element of this system
requires additional hardware. Offsetting the high development cost associated with
this implementation, is the minimal impact it will have on the production system.
Eliminating redesign of production hardware and the associated ISA reduces the in-
tegration costs. This hardware will be integrated throughout the entire motherboard
in production systems, with the most notable addition being a dedicated security
processor and memory. Much of this new hardware will be monitors which must
be designed to successfully capture the targeted information accurately and securely.
These monitors and the dedicated security processor will incur a significant cost for
their design and development. This cost presents a significant obstacle to overcome
in terms of developing the SHI(EL)DS architecture, but these costs are offset by the
security gains of the proposed solution presented in this chapter. For security critical
systems and networks, additional costs for improved security is a reasonable expendi-
ture. A SHI(EL)DS equipped system would present a costs estimate less than double
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that of an unprotected system, based purely off component costs. This rough esti-
mate assumes to key pieces of information to cap the cost estimate: not every single
component is monitored, and monitors are comparatively simple pieces of hardware
to what they are monitoring.
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VI. Integrating SHI(EL)DS Into the Cybercraft Initiative
T
his chapter presents the Air Force’s Cybercraft initiative and show how the
SHI(EL)DS research integrates into it. It begins by describing the basic ideas
behind Cybercraft and key ideas and capabilities relating to Cybercraft. Once the
basics of this initiative are established, the benefits of using SHI(EL)DS in Cybercraft
are shown and key capabilities provided are explored. This chapter looks at both the
general concepts and more specific details in terms of how this research improves
Cybercraft.
6.1 Cybercraft
The overarching goal of the Cybercraft initiative is to create a trusted deploy-
ment platform for blue information systems [69]. Current research focuses on deploy-
ing Cybercraft to internet protocol (IP) administration networks, with the intention
of eventually covering the entire blue cyber infrastructure. Cybercraft provides for
the deployment of defensive capabilities to the cyber infrastructure through a trusted
platform.
6.1.1 Cybercraft Architecture Objectives. In creating the basic architecture
specifications, four key objectives are identified [7]. These objectives influence the
design direction in different ways. The second and third objectives pertain mostly
to the intercommunication architecture between systems. The first and fourth each
influence the architectural requirements of the Cybercraft specification significantly.
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Simple Must have a consistent design
Scalable Support operations on more than one million systems
Reliable Cannot allow single points of failure
Provable Provably secure operation of the Cybercraft is paramount
6.1.2 Cybercraft Problem Domains. AFCYBER Mission Roles and Respon-
sibilities described in [75] are mapped to Cybercraft problem domains in an attempt
to bridge the transition between operational and real world requirements. The Cy-
bercraft problem domains are listed here with some basic descriptions [69, 21].
C3 Protocols and Architecture Command, control, and communication (C3) pro-
tocols need to support more than one million nodes with a secure architecture.
Map and Mission Context A key role of Cybercraft is distributed information
retrieval.
Environment Description To understand the environment that Cybercraft are de-
ployed in the system must merge sensor information into an understanding of
the state of the system
Formal Model and Policy Formally modeling the Cybercraft and establishing poli-
cies will help ensure that the system operates in the manner intended by com-
manders.
Payload Interfaces These interfaces need to be dynamically alterable. This allows
for updated solutions to be reliably uploaded to the Cybercraft platform.
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Self-Protection Guarantee Creating a Cybercraft deployment platform which can
provide a high level of security to itself is essential for continued trusted opera-
tions of the Cybercraft infrastructure.
6.1.3 Main Cybercraft Components. The Cybercraft concept at the individ-
ual systems level is composed of two main ideas: the Cybercraft deployment platform
and payloads which are loaded onto them [21]. This section presents the basic de-
scription of each here and attempts to draw clear lines between the roles of each in a
systems defense.
Cybercraft Deployment Platform Trusted mechanism residing on protected sys-
tems, responsible for providing a framework to gathering data, interacting with
the system, and communicating with the entire Cybercraft infrastructure. The
key design focus is to provide the necessary capabilities, in a trusted platform.
Payloads Specific sensors, decision engines, and effectors which are uploaded to the
Cybercraft deployment platform.
This research fits well into the goals and requirements for the Cybercraft deployment
platform. The following section describes in detail the aspects of this system that
provide a basis for developing the Cybercraft deployment platform. It also ties this
development back to the Cybercraft problem domain discussed in Section 6.1.2
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6.2 Mapping Cybercraft Deployment Platform Requirements to SHI(EL)DS
Capabilities
6.2.1 Trusting the Cybercraft. One of the most critical issues of Cybercraft
is the ability to trust the platform and it’s payload to operate correctly. As seen in
Section 6.1.2, the ability to guarantee self-protection is one of the core Cybercraft
problem domains. Two key components to achieving this is establishing a root of
trust and reducing the avenues of attack to a defendable quantity. The SHI(EL)DS
architecture makes significant progress towards both of these requirements.
6.2.1.1 Root of Trust for Cybercraft Deployment Platform. The SHI(EL)DS
research provides the potential for meeting all three roots of trust as defined by the
TCG [24] in Section 2.3.2.
Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) As this research has developed, the only
way to trust measurements about the production system is to achieve at least
First-hand Information for anything that is being measured. This system is
designed to gather at worst First-hand Information from everything that it
monitors.
Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) Significant work has gone into attempting to
create trustworthy storage via both maintaining higher levels of privilege for
the security systems storage and through encrypting the data being stored. By
creating a physically separate storage for the security system, it eliminates all
direct access to the security systems storage.
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Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) The separate security network presented in
this research provides an avenue for trusted reporting. By not relying on the
production system to transmit messages this system presents a more secure
communication pathway.
By proposing a system that can provide each of these roots of trust this research
enables a high level of confidence in this security architecture. Since this architecture
does not allow for the production system to modify the code of the security system,
barring an attack by someone with physical access to the system to compromise the
security system software, when the system is initiated it is in a trustworthy state.
6.2.1.2 Reducing Avenues of Attack. The SHI(EL)DS architecture is
designed to allow only constrained hardware-based communication pathways between
the production and security systems. This limiting of the communication reduces
the main avenues of attack on the security system to a small set of mainly passive
monitors. These monitors can be designed with security as their primary focus, not
performance, since they will have little to no effect on the production system, unless
responding to an attack. Many current security solutions utilize software communica-
tion from the kernel and share main memory. Both of these aspects present avenues
of attack upon the security system.
6.2.2 Accurate Information Retrieval. Leveraging an understanding of the
need for First-hand Information to guarantee accurate information retrieval by the
security system, the SHI(EL)DS architecture is in a unique position to ensure that the
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information gathered is indeed representative of the state of the monitored system. As
we become aware of new pieces of information which will benefit the Cybercraft mis-
sion, new modules can be designed to fit into the SHI(EL)DS architecture that achieve
at least First-hand Information about the targeted mechanism. Another key aspect
of the information retrieval provided by this security system is that it can continue
to report information on the state of the production system after that production
system has been compromised. Since there is a separate backplane architecture, an
attack must also compromise it to reliably achieve a stealthy attack on the overall
system. This will allow for insight into the malicious activities being performed by
the compromised system to be leveraged by the entire Cybercraft infrastructure.
6.2.3 Merging Gathered Information. The inclusion of a dedicated security
processor in the SHI(EL)DS architecture allows for a secure location to analyze data
on the state of the production system. From there the security processor can both
react to potential threats it sees on the local machine and transmit secure communi-
cations back to a higher level system in the Cybercraft communications architecture.
If this information must be passed over normal Internet connections, strong encryp-
tion must be employed to secure it as best as possible. Even if the information is
passed solely over the security network backplane, encryption should still be used to
help protect against the possible physical breach threat. This data can be compiled
from a multitude of Cybercraft deployment platforms to provide a understanding of
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trends in systems usage and provide additional knowledge to make decisions about




e conclude this work be reviewing the key findings of this research and
presenting a number of areas for future work which are illuminated by it.
7.1 Conclusions
7.1.1 Trustworthiness of Information. By developing this axis of classifi-
cation, key insights into the development of security systems are gained. Design of
new security systems will have a clear understanding of what is required to guarantee
accurate information about the production system and what they sacrifice by not
achieving at least First-hand Information.
7.1.2 Necessity of Dedicated Hardware for Security. This research presented
a number of key advantages offered by properly designed security hardware and ex-
plored what is necessary for proper design. This research into the design of hardware
is critical, since improperly designed hardware leaves significant vulnerabilities in the
system. Each of the following abilities is gained only through the use of dedicated
hardware or is significantly enhanced by its use.
Reduced Avenues of Attack Separating the security system into dedicated hard-
ware allows for defining the exact connections between the security and produc-
tions systems.
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Ability to Gather Trustworthy Information This new axis defined illuminates
the need for security solutions which can provide First-hand Information. Only
hardware-based solutions can accomplish this.
Additional/Different Information Available Hardware dedicated to monitoring
information not normally exposed by the processor, such as Mott’s research, pro-
vides previously unavailable information to be leveraged for security purposes.
An example of this include the value of the program counter register.
Timeliness of Detection Network ID and processor monitoring are two scenarios
where the speed of dedicated hardware can greatly enhance the security capa-
bilities.
Physical Response Dedicated hardware can provide added physical security for
remote computer systems by providing a destructive response when compromise
is detected.
7.1.3 Requirements for Effective Hardware Design. By defining a list of
requirements for hardware-based security system design this research provides vital
insight into the design of future security systems. These requirements, relisted here,
each provide unique aspects of security to potential solutions. The first four design
elements listed below form requirements for any partial or complete security solution
to be effective and secure. The final design element is required for producing complete
security solutions.
• First-hand information of all monitored information
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• Dedicated monitors for parallel, concurrent monitoring
• Explicit hardware communication between the production and security systems
• Dedicated storage of security code and data
• Dedicated security processor for controlling and coordinating the security mech-
anisms
7.1.4 Modular, Hardware-based Security Framework. Using the insight from
the above contributions, this work developed key aspects of an extensible security
solution. This hardware-based security backplane, SHI(EL)DS, provides a modular
framework which can be extended both with new local security mechanisms and into
a network security backplane. It provides a comprehensive system approach to gather
unique, accurate information from system components and make the security system
itself more secure. It is designed to adhere to each of the requirements reiterated in
Section 7.1.3 and provide significant advantages to each of the benefits discussed in
Section 7.1.2.
7.1.5 Cybercraft Deployment Platform Development. The Cybercraft ini-
tiative represents a new focus on more comprehensive security solutions throughout
the entire cyber infrastructure. The SHI(EL)DS architecture provides a basis for the
Cybercraft Deployment Platform and provides significant progress to many of the
essential requirements of Cybercraft. SHI(EL)DS’ improvement towards the security
and trust of the Cybercraft Deployment Platform is provided by the hardware sep-
aration which reduces the avenues of attack on the security system to a limited and
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well understood set of hardware communication pathways. If these pathways can be
proven secure, it is possible to prove the entire security system is also secure from an
attack that originates on the production system. To accomplish this one must also
prove that the understood hardware communication pathways are the only avenues of
attack from the production system to the security system. The SHI(EL)DS architec-
ture also involves hardware primitives designed to gather information not previously
available to the system. This information helps to provide the Cybercraft payloads
with a greater depth of information to apply sensors, decision engines, and effectors
to.
7.2 Future Work
While this research presents a number of key contributions to the field of com-
puter security and the need for hardware in this field, it also opens up numerous
avenues of research to press forward with. This section describes some of these areas
of future work here.
7.2.1 Security Backplane Prototypes. This research has developed a system-
wide hardware-based security backplane architecture. Although this system provides
the potential to become the base of a complete security solution, prototyping the
SHI(EL)DS architecture is a massive undertaking. This section presents a few sug-
gestions of the first steps towards prototyping this system and demonstrating key
abilities that this system provides.
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7.2.1.1 Local Security Backplane Prototype. The primary system ele-
ments which need to be developed are the dedicated security processor and memory,
key monitoring devices such as the memory controller, and the dedicated security
communication pathways. By beginning with the security processor and communi-
cation pathways this achitecture develops a core system which can be built upon to
add features. A first prototype would involve mechanisms such as a SRAS discussed
in Section 4.3.4.2. Another important monitor to be included in a SHI(EL)DS proto-
type is one which monitors the memory controller. This key location begins to spread
the focus of computer security out from the current two focuses: processor ID and
network ID. While these two areas are arguably the most important areas to secure,
Rutkowska’s work [63] demonstrates that they are not the only avenues of attack to
compromise a system.
7.2.1.2 Security Backplane Communication. Another important area
of future research is exploring ways to combine information from different mecha-
nisms within the security backplane architecture. One straightforward example of
this mentioned in this research is when the local security system recognizes the pro-
duction system is compromised. It can either cut its network access on its own or
communicate with other networked backplanes to ensure they block communications
from the compromised production system combining elements of host based IDS and
network IDS. While this example shows obvious benefit, other communications and
coordination between mechanisms of the security solution can provide the potential
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for increased flexibility and accuracy of response. A couple possible examples of this
communication include:
• Allowing suspicious, but not known malicious, packets onto the system and
notifying other security mechanisms to suspect compromise more readily.
• Notifying the network IDS portions of all systems when a system is known to
be compromised to help update and improve their identification process. This
idea is discussed in slightly more detail below.
• Isolating system components which are likely to be corrupted and attempting
to continue operating at a reduced capacity.
7.2.1.3 Networked Security Backplane Prototype. While expanding
the SHI(EL)DS concept into a network security backplane requires a local prototype to
be established first, a proof-of-concept can be realized using standard hardware much
more quickly. A simple scenario can be modeled through simulating a compromise of
a production system and providing notification to a central network security system,
which leverages the recorded network traffic of a known compromised system to more
accurately identify malicious packets. By leveraging this capability this architecture
can gain an ability to shape the network ID response through this out-of-band analysis.
This ability is similar to the learning phase for artificial immune systems. Having this
feedback improves the adaptability of this security system. This improvement comes
from being able to leverage the detection of malicious packets on one system to update
the future detection criteria on another system. Modeling the production system
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having both its internal and external network access blocked is also a realizable goal
for a network security backplane prototype and can be used to minimize the impact
of a single compromised system on the entire network’s operation.
7.2.1.4 Incorporate SHI(EL)DS into Network Devices. Although this
research is focused on a standard desktop or server computer architecture, the un-
derstanding gained in Chapter III can also be leveraged to adapt the SHI(EL)DS
architecture to work on devices such as network switches, routers, and gateways. Ex-
tending the SHI(EL)DS architecture into these devices is the only way to achieve
First-hand Information from networks’ first line of defense. Research into this area
can help protect networks from attacks that compromise these devices to provide in-
ternal network access and the ability to snoop internal communications. This research
can also be tied into the other elements of SHI(EL)DS to provide an even more com-
prehensive security solution. Knowledge from each level of the security backplane can
be combined to provide a more complete picture of what is happening on Air Force
networks and enable more informed, detailed responses.
7.2.2 Combine SHI(EL)DS Architecture with Current Solutions. One of
the most useful features of the SHI(EL)DS architecture is its ability to adapt other
security concepts into the basic design. By leveraging a dedicated security processor,
software-based solutions can be adapted to run without having to contend for produc-
tion system resources. The central security processor with dedicated communications
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pathways allows for an easily extensible backplane which can incorporate different
hardware primitives and monitoring concepts.
7.2.2.1 Incorporating Network Hardware and Software Solutions. Net-
work solutions such as Haag’s jREMISA, discussed in Section 4.1.2, can be incorpo-
rated into the SHI(EL)DS architecture as software running on the security system.
Once a SHI(EL)DS prototype is designed, software solutions such as jREMISA can
be adapted to react to the information gathered by the hardware monitors.
7.2.2.2 Incorporating Hardware Primitives. Mott’s work presents a
number of hardware primitives which provide new information and new capabili-
ties [48]. Each of these primitives presents a potential module to be added to the
core SHI(EL)DS architecture. Research on the cost and benefits of each of these
when incorporated into this system will provide useful direction into which security
mechanisms to add to SHI(EL)DS first, to create a more complete security solution.
This research will be aided by the understanding of the benefits and requirements of
designing dedicated hardware for security.
7.2.2.3 Incorporating Other Hardware Solutions. Solutions such as the
hardware-based network IDSs discussed in Section 4.3.3 present systems which can be
adapted to operate within the bounds of the SHI(EL)DS architecture. Research into
which of these systems provides the most beneficial and complete network protection
and which will integrate with SHI(EL)DS most efficiently will provide a successful
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leap forward in designing complete, hardware-based security solutions. These systems
should be analyzed against the understanding of the capabilities hardware can provide.
This work in understanding the need for dedicated hardware and the requirements for
providing new or enhanced capabilities presents a path forward in analyzing proposed
hardware solutions, both on their own and as an element to be incorporated into the
SHI(EL)DS architecture.
7.2.3 Explore Network Backplane as Forensics Tool. By creating a security
system with its own dedicated storage, this architecture improves the capabilities
of computer forensics significantly. Tuting’s thesis presents research into gathering
accurate information of the production systems memory and analyzing it for forensic
purposes. Significant progress can be made by melding this work in forensics into
the SHI(EL)DS architecture. SHI(EL)DS provides this work with the potential for
dedicated processing power to analyze the information gathered. It also provides a
trusted avenue for receiving First-hand Information so it can ensure that it performs
its forensic analysis on the actual state of the system.
7.2.4 Explore New Hardware Primitives to Add as SHI(EL)DS Modules.
Work such as Mott’s thesis present a number of different hardware primitives which
provide unique information about a system that was not available without his pro-
posed hardware changes [48]. With the understanding gained through this work in
terms of what is required to yield security benefits from hardware, it provides a solid
framework for exploring new locations within a system to insert hardware primitives
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and monitor previously unavailable information. This work in understanding the need
for hardware and developing the SHI(EL)DS architecture will also aid in understand-
ing the cost/benefit analysis of different hardware primitives to add once they are
discovered.
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Appendix A. jREMISA Enhancements: Two-layer Network Intrusion
Detection System
T
he goal of this software is to enhance the functionality of jREMISA [25] by
tuning it to be extra aggressive in identifying Non-self packets and adding an
additional automated decision maker (a second IDS) inline between the current AIS
and the system administrators. By tuning the initial jREMISA algorithm to be extra
aggressive, the focus of the secondary IDS changes from that of a standard IDS. This
system now focuses on identifying those suspicious packets that are indeed Self, i.e.
identifying each False Positive.1 Many options are available to us for creating this
second level of security. A second AIS or another form of Evolutionary Algorithm.
Although the scale of the data has been reduced from the initial load to be examined
the dataset is large enough to make classic deterministic search algorithms impractical.
With a primary focus on securing a system completely (at the risk of reduced
functionality) the goals of ID can be focused specifically on the speed of detection, and
the minimization of False Negatives. This focus will most likely result in a significantly
increased False Positive rate as well. By creating a second layer to inspect purely the
signals which have been blocked, timeliness becomes significantly less critical since the
packet will not be allowed. This provides us the opportunity to leverage this extra
time flexibility to create a significantly more complex second level detector which
can provide more accurate identification and potentially allow falsely denied packages
1When examining the code base of jREMISA modified for these experiments it is important to
note that the definition of False Positive and False Negative are reversed, i.e. a False Positive is a
Non-self recognized as Self and likewise for the False Negative.
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access once they have been cleared. Regardless of which type of algorithm is applied
for the secondary system, in order to render it effective the selection criteria must be
as orthogonal as possible. Careful tuning of parameters can help to accomplish this,
as well as examining different portions of the packet in the initial jREMISA run and
the secondary IDS run. The goal is to attempt to loosely and conservatively identify
possible Non-self packets and then take a closer look at all of these packets, hoping
to identify key aspects separating Self from Non-self which would not be apparent
in or masked by the complete network data set.
One benefit gained through the use of a secondary IDS which is only examining
those packets assumed to be Non-self is time. The reasoning for this is twofold: (1)
since the first layer have already let through the major portion of Self packets is allows
the majority of network traffic to continue unhindered through the system, only slow-
ing down the suspicious packets and (2) since most current systems rely on a human
in the loop such as a system administrator to provide this second level of defense, a
substantial amount of slowdown would be required to present an automated secondary
system which would not still be significantly faster than this human’s identification
of Self and Non-self packets. This increase in time presents us with the opportunity
to implement a more detailed and accurate identification system by trading off speed
performance. Significantly more involved systems can be implemented to leverage this
idea while still providing performance far more expedient than the standard human
in the loop. One more advanced option would be to oﬄoad all suspicious packets to a
dedicated system which uses the entirety of its resources to reclassify packets as Self
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or Non-self and return the former packets flagged to be allowed through the initial
jREMISA system at the primary location.
A.1 Design of Experiments
As proof of concept these experiments run the jREMISA algorithm on a single
day truth set, from the MIT Lincoln Laboratory 1999 Intrusion Detection Evalua-
tion Data Sets [46], two times with varied parameters to simulate at least partially
orthogonal selection parameters. When the attack data is run through the jREMISA
algorithm with the first selection parameters all False and True Positives are recorded.2
With the second selection parameters, only attack day data set packets which were
flagged as Non-self through the system are run. By showing a resultant classification
which is more accurate than either of the selection parameters run by themselves
against the entire attack day data set, it demonstrates the viability of these enhance-
ments.
A.2 Results
Once the negative selection phase of the jREMISA algorithm is completed on
each day’s data, the MOEA step is executed, recording all packets positively identified
as Non-self regardless of this validity. This research achieves results relatively similar
to that achieved by Haag. These results are shown in Table 1
2As defined in this document, not the jREMISA code base.
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Attack Day True Pos. False Neg. True Neg. False Pos.
Monday 99.4346% 0.5653% 84.9497% 15.0503%
Tuesday 70.2127% 29.7873% 86.8922% 13.1078%
Wednesday 71.8897% 28.1103% 82.2047% 17.7953%
Thursday 94.4111% 5.5889% 77.3912% 22.6088%
Friday 99.8226% 0.1774% 72.7075% 27.2925%
Table 1: First Pass jREMISA MOEA results
Using the positively identified packets file, this software runs through the jREMISA
algorithm again, focusing only on those packets which were positively identified for
shaping of the MOEA. This research focuses on the Friday data, from the Lincoln
Laboratory Dataset, since it provides the best coverage from the standard jREMISA
first pass and therefore likely represents the most difficult to further improve. The
results of this can be seen in Table 2. It is important to note that the percentages rep-
resented in this table are only in reference to the two specific categories from Friday’s
data in the previous table: the True and False Positives.
Attack Day True Pos. False Neg. True Neg. False Pos.
Friday 99.9613% 0.0388% 83.1607% 16.8393%
Table 2: Second Pass jREMISA MOEA Friday Results
Table 3 shows the updated overall percentage for the Friday data. This data
shows a significantly reduced percentage of Self packets misidentified with a fairly
small hit to the accuracy of identifying Non-self.
Attack Day True Pos. False Neg. True Neg. False Pos.
Friday 99.7840% 0.2160% 95.4041% 4.5959%
Table 3: Overall Enhanced jREMISA Friday Results
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Although this decrease in the True Positive accuracy is contrary to arguably the
most important goal there are a number of key points which mitigate this undesirable
consequence. First and foremost, the code used to demonstrate this feasibility is
optimized for a single pass on that data; with this two-pass approach the first approach
can be specifically tailored to approach 100% accuracy on the True Positives, by
deemphasizing the negative effect of a False Positive report. While this approach will
present an increase in the number of False Positives, the second pass has been shown
as a feasible method for reducing this increase. Secondly, since only the stochastic
nature of the MOEA are used to create some level of orthogonality between the
first and second pass filtering, this aspect has certainly not been exploited to its full
potential. Finally, these feasibility experiments do not in any way leverage one of
the most important advantages of this two pass system: a significant increase in the
available processing time for the second pass. With data the presents the two-pass
system as a viable method of further classifying network packets, this work shows that
leveraging a two-pass concept in overall security system design can have a positive
impact to overall accuracy.
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